Answering Moral Skepticism (PDF)
(Sprache: Englisch)
Most thoughtful people worry at one time or another about whether there can actually be such a thing as objective moral truth. They might wonder, for example, whether the prevalence of moral disagreement makes it reasonable to conclude that there aren't...
sofort als Download lieferbar
eBook (pdf)
Fr. 31.90
inkl. MwSt.
- Kreditkarte, Paypal, Rechnung
- Kostenloser tolino webreader
Produktdetails
Produktinformationen zu „Answering Moral Skepticism (PDF)“
Most thoughtful people worry at one time or another about whether there can actually be such a thing as objective moral truth. They might wonder, for example, whether the prevalence of moral disagreement makes it reasonable to conclude that there aren't really any moral facts at all. Or they might be bothered by questions like these: What could objective moral facts possibly be like? Isn't it obvious that morality is simply relative to particular societies and particular times? If there were moral facts, how could we ever come to know anything about them? Can morality really have the motivating and rational force we normally take it to have? How can one possibly find a place for objective moral values in a scientific worldview?
Some people are driven by questions like these to the conclusion that we should embrace skepticism about morality, denying the very existence of anything worthy of the name. In Answering Moral Skepticism, Shelly Kagan shows how those who accept the existence of objective moral truth can provide plausible answers to these questions. Focusing throughout on issues that trouble reflective individuals, Kagan provides an accessible defense of the belief in objective morality will be of interest to both students of metaethics as well as anyone worried about the objectivity of their own moral judgements.
Some people are driven by questions like these to the conclusion that we should embrace skepticism about morality, denying the very existence of anything worthy of the name. In Answering Moral Skepticism, Shelly Kagan shows how those who accept the existence of objective moral truth can provide plausible answers to these questions. Focusing throughout on issues that trouble reflective individuals, Kagan provides an accessible defense of the belief in objective morality will be of interest to both students of metaethics as well as anyone worried about the objectivity of their own moral judgements.
Autoren-Porträt von Shelly Kagan
Shelly Kagan is the Clark Professor of Philosophy at Yale University. A popular lecturer at Yale, Kagan's lectures on death have been watched online by millions of people around the world, and a book based on the course, Death, has been a national best seller in both S. Korea and Japan. His recent books include How to Count Animals, More or Less (OUP 2019) and The Geometry of Desert (OUP 2012).
Bibliographische Angaben
- Autor: Shelly Kagan
- 2023, Englisch
- Verlag: Oxford University Press
- ISBN-10: 0197689000
- ISBN-13: 9780197689004
- Erscheinungsdatum: 26.09.2023
Abhängig von Bildschirmgrösse und eingestellter Schriftgrösse kann die Seitenzahl auf Ihrem Lesegerät variieren.
eBook Informationen
- Dateiformat: PDF
- Grösse: 23 MB
- Mit Kopierschutz
Sprache:
Englisch
Kopierschutz
Dieses eBook können Sie uneingeschränkt auf allen Geräten der tolino Familie lesen. Zum Lesen auf sonstigen eReadern und am PC benötigen Sie eine Adobe ID.
Kommentar zu "Answering Moral Skepticism"
0 Gebrauchte Artikel zu „Answering Moral Skepticism“
| Zustand | Preis | Porto | Zahlung | Verkäufer | Rating |
|---|
Schreiben Sie einen Kommentar zu "Answering Moral Skepticism".
Kommentar verfassen