Governing Europe Efficiently: An Analysis into the Theory of Public Goods and Democratic Legitimation for the Eurozone, with Examples from the USA and Canada
(Sprache: Englisch)
Europe's Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is in urgent need of reform. The Euro crisis has exposed this need in a dramatic and unprecedented fashion. Yet, crisis reactions on behalf of Eurozone policy-makers have been piecemeal and hesitant, instead of...
Voraussichtlich lieferbar in 3 Tag(en)
versandkostenfrei
Buch (Kartoniert)
Fr. 60.00
inkl. MwSt.
- Kreditkarte, Paypal, Rechnungskauf
- 30 Tage Widerrufsrecht
Produktdetails
Produktinformationen zu „Governing Europe Efficiently: An Analysis into the Theory of Public Goods and Democratic Legitimation for the Eurozone, with Examples from the USA and Canada “
Klappentext zu „Governing Europe Efficiently: An Analysis into the Theory of Public Goods and Democratic Legitimation for the Eurozone, with Examples from the USA and Canada “
Europe's Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is in urgent need of reform. The Euro crisis has exposed this need in a dramatic and unprecedented fashion. Yet, crisis reactions on behalf of Eurozone policy-makers have been piecemeal and hesitant, instead of constituting effective reforms capable of remedying the weaknesses of the EMU's system of governance.This book, compiled by five scholars of the University of Hamburg, provides an in-depth analysis of the flaws of Eurozone governance by means of an innovative analytical framework based on fiscal federalism theory and game theory, further enriched by insights of theories of democratic legitimation. Its major focus is on understanding Eurozone governance as the provision of different types of public goods, each of which requires an adequate governmental structure. The study is enhanced by lessons from historical developments in currency unification in the US and in Canada which help to put the Eurozone's woes into perspective. On the whole, this book may serve as a comprehensive guide for policy-makers, scholars and all others interested in finding a long-term solution to preserving and stabilizing the Eurozone.
Lese-Probe zu „Governing Europe Efficiently: An Analysis into the Theory of Public Goods and Democratic Legitimation for the Eurozone, with Examples from the USA and Canada “
Chapter II, Theory of Public Goods, Club Goods and Common Property Resources - by Sebastian Salch & Benjamin Spörer:Common currencies face many difficulties and critical moments in their conception. Most obviously, however, collective action problems need to be solved for the proper functioning of a single currency. In the historical example of the United States of America, we could observe that there were different struggles to improve the efficiency of providing the common good of financial stability, with sufficient accountability to public oversight. Therefore, we will now turn to the theory of public goods, game theory and the theory of fiscal federalism, in order to find an appropriate framework in which these collective action problems can be solved in the case of a single currency and a federation.
1, Description & Categorization:
There exists a variety of literature concerning goods as well as the problems that occur with regard to their characteristics. In general, 'a good is something from which some utility or benefit is derived' (Collignon, 2003: 91). The provision of a good incurs costs by requiring resources. Offsetting costs against benefits, the value of a good is its net benefit. Therefore, the ultimate goal must be an efficient resource allocation to maximize the net benefits (ibid.). Depending on the characteristics of the good, different problems occur in ensuring such efficiency. The most common distinction in the literature is the distinction between private and public goods.
Before discussing the different types of goods it may be helpful to specify which aspects are of interest. Dealing with various goods we will focus on the differences within two main aspects: the provision or supply of certain goods, and the consumption of certain goods. These two aspects stress the questions: Who bears the costs of the provision of a good? Who benefits from it? And through which mechanism(s) can an efficient resource allocation be
... mehr
achieved?
Secondary questions in this context are: Who provides a good? Is the provision of the good divisible or not? What is the consumption pattern like? Is the consumption rival? Who has access to consumption? Can potential consumers be excluded or not? Depending on the answers to the aforementioned questions additional questions may follow to highlight the problem of the efficient provision of goods.
To make a clear distinction between the different types of goods, we will first focus on ideal types, i.e. private and public goods, before stressing the difficulties which occur with hybrid types of goods.
1.1, Ideal Types of Goods:
1.1.1, Private Goods:
Private goods are restricted to individuals. Individuals will consume, if the marginal utility is higher than the marginal costs. Within the ideally functioning market, the access to a good requires a reimbursement. The potential consumers articulate their preferences to the producers via the price-mechanism and the producers will produce the demanded goods, simultaneously trying to maximize their profits through minimizing their costs. Competition assures that the combination of the produced goods will meet the consumers' preferences (Musgrave et al. 1994: 68). Therefore, the economy can reach a state of maximum efficiency regarding its resource allocation. One key condition for this mechanism is the existence of property rights, which means that other consumers are excludable (Kaul et al., 1999: 3). Concerning private goods, the provision of a good depends on the payment (Aggarwal; Dupont, 1999: 395). If A buys apples and B does not because B has no money, then A will be the only one who consumes it. The apples become A's property through the payment and thereby B is excluded from the consumption of the apples. This example highlights another aspect which is usually characteristic of private goods: the consumption of private goods is rival. The one apple A just bought is not available for B anymore, even if B did have the m
Secondary questions in this context are: Who provides a good? Is the provision of the good divisible or not? What is the consumption pattern like? Is the consumption rival? Who has access to consumption? Can potential consumers be excluded or not? Depending on the answers to the aforementioned questions additional questions may follow to highlight the problem of the efficient provision of goods.
To make a clear distinction between the different types of goods, we will first focus on ideal types, i.e. private and public goods, before stressing the difficulties which occur with hybrid types of goods.
1.1, Ideal Types of Goods:
1.1.1, Private Goods:
Private goods are restricted to individuals. Individuals will consume, if the marginal utility is higher than the marginal costs. Within the ideally functioning market, the access to a good requires a reimbursement. The potential consumers articulate their preferences to the producers via the price-mechanism and the producers will produce the demanded goods, simultaneously trying to maximize their profits through minimizing their costs. Competition assures that the combination of the produced goods will meet the consumers' preferences (Musgrave et al. 1994: 68). Therefore, the economy can reach a state of maximum efficiency regarding its resource allocation. One key condition for this mechanism is the existence of property rights, which means that other consumers are excludable (Kaul et al., 1999: 3). Concerning private goods, the provision of a good depends on the payment (Aggarwal; Dupont, 1999: 395). If A buys apples and B does not because B has no money, then A will be the only one who consumes it. The apples become A's property through the payment and thereby B is excluded from the consumption of the apples. This example highlights another aspect which is usually characteristic of private goods: the consumption of private goods is rival. The one apple A just bought is not available for B anymore, even if B did have the m
... weniger
Autoren-Porträt
Benjamin Spörer, B.A., wurde 1986 in Bühl/Baden geboren. Sein Studium der Politikwissenschaften und Soziologie an der Philosophischen Fakultät der Rheinischen Friedrich- Wilhelms-Universität Bonn schloss er 2011 mit dem akademischen Grad Bachelor of Arts erfolgreich ab. Bereits während des Studiums stellte sich bei dem Autor ein Fokus auf europapolitischen Themen mit demokratietheoretischen Implikationen heraus. Auf politischen Reisen sowie Arbeitsaufenthalten innerhalb und ausserhalb Europas, im Nahen Osten und in Lateinamerika nahm Herr Spörer an zahlreichen Gesprächen und Diskussionen mit politischen Akteuren und Experten teil und konnte somit zusätzlich weiteres Detailwissen gewinnen. Derzeit absolviert er das internationale Masterprogramm European Studies an der Universität Hamburg.
Bibliographische Angaben
- 2014, Erstauflage, 100 Seiten, Masse: 15,5 x 22 cm, Kartoniert (TB), Englisch
- Verlag: Anchor Academic Publishing
- ISBN-10: 3954893274
- ISBN-13: 9783954893270
Sprache:
Englisch
Kommentar zu "Governing Europe Efficiently: An Analysis into the Theory of Public Goods and Democratic Legitimation for the Eurozone, with Examples from the USA and Canada"
0 Gebrauchte Artikel zu „Governing Europe Efficiently: An Analysis into the Theory of Public Goods and Democratic Legitimation for the Eurozone, with Examples from the USA and Canada“
Zustand | Preis | Porto | Zahlung | Verkäufer | Rating |
---|
Schreiben Sie einen Kommentar zu "Governing Europe Efficiently: An Analysis into the Theory of Public Goods and Democratic Legitimation for the Eurozone, with Examples from the USA and Canada".
Kommentar verfassen