1 Introduction

1.1 An historical inquiry into the European public sphere

The idea of a European public sphere emerged and gained greater currency in a Europe-wide debate among intellectuals in the early 1990s as a response to the advances of European integration.[1] As the European Union (EU)[2] increasingly adopted state-like features and as the "permissive consensus" among citizens appeared to be waning in the wake of the Maastricht Treaty,[3] academic and political observers started to voice their concerns about a growing democratic deficit.[4] Critics tended to judge the EU by the familiar and seemingly self-evident standards of national democratic institutions. Consequently, some of them called for a European constitution that would install the tried and tested institutional instruments of the nation state at the European level, too.[5] However, contrasting Europe to the nation state, many critics questioned the societal preconditions for democracy at the European level: Above all, it was difficult to define Europe's sovereign, the *European* people. The German constitutional court even argued that there was no European *demos*.[6] The lack of a solid European identity, an active European civil society and a critical European public sphere seemed all too obvious. Accordingly, many of the critics doubted that legitimate democratic governance at the European level was possible.[7]

Jürgen Habermas criticised such essentialist notions of the nation implicitly defined as an ethnic or cultural community and called for a civic identity based on transnational communication instead.[8] Similarly, the sociologists Klaus Eder and

1   Most influentially: Dieter Grimm, „Does Europe need a Constitution?," *European Law Journal* 1 (1995), Jürgen Habermas, "Remarks on Dieter Grimm's 'Does Europe need a constitution?'," *European Law Journal* 1 (1995).
2   For the time period of my study, I will use the historically appropriate term European Community/ies (EC). However, for phenomena that continue to be of relevance or mainly relate to the post-Maastricht period, I will use European Union (EU).
3   Cf. e.g. Mark Franklin, Michael Marsh, and Lauren McLaren, „Uncorking the bottle. Popular opposition to European unification in the wake of Maastricht," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 32 (1994). The concept of the "permissive consensus" was coined by Leon N. Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold, *Europe's Would-be Polity. Patterns of Change in the European Community* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1970). 249–278.
4   For an overview of the post-Maastricht debate see: Joseph H. H. Weiler, Ulrich R. Haltern, and Franz C. Mayer, „European Democracy and its Critique," *West European Politics* 18 (1995). For the more recent debate cf.: Andreas Follesdal and Simon Hix, "Why There is a Democratic Deficit in the EU: A Response to Majone and Moravcsik," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 44 (2006).
5   On the importance of the the nation state as a model cf. John W. Meyer et al., „World Society and the Nation-State," *American Journal of Sociology* 103 (1997): 145f.
6   Bundesverfassungsgericht, „Maastricht-Urteil," *BVerfGE* 89 (12 October, 1993).
7   E.g. Grimm, „Does Europe need a Constitution?.", Peter Graf Kielmansegg, „Integration und Demokratie," in *Europäische Integration*, ed. Markus Jachtenfuchs and Beate Kohler-Koch (Opladen, 1996). Cf. also: Claus Offe, „Gibt es eine europäische Gesellschaft? Kann es sie geben?," *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik* 46 (2001): 431, 435. Philip Schlesinger, „Europeanisation and the Media: national identity and the public sphere," in *ARENA Working Paper 7/1995* (Oslo, 1995).
8   Habermas, „Remarks on Dieter Grimm's ‚Does Europe need a constitution?'," 306.

Cathleen Kantner warned against the fallacies of "methodological nationalism".[9] They argued that the national model could not simply be transposed to the European level. The notion of an emerging "European society",[10] the specific problems of European democracy and the European public sphere required novel conceptualisations and political solutions.[11] Eder and others emphasised that the concept of the European public sphere had to take into account both the specific normative expectations with regard to European democracy and the particular empirical conditions for communication in the context of European integration.[12] The transnational controversy in respect of the European public sphere triggered a wave of conceptual investigations and empirical research. Thus, from the end of the 1990s onwards, social and political scientists started various research projects in order to gather empirical evidence.[13]

The concept of the European public sphere is polysemic. At least three different meanings can be distinguished. The idea first emerged as a *political concept* in the specific context of the EU in the post-Maastricht period. Subsequently, the term has been used both as an *analytical concept* for empirical research and as a *descriptive term* for the empirical reality of European public communication. When they began to study the European public sphere empirically, social scientists faced the challenge of operationalising a normative political idea. Ever since Habermas introduced his notion of the public sphere in the 1960s, the term had carried strong normative and critical connotations.[14] At the same time, researchers had to devise an analytical concept adequate for empirical research at the European level. They assumed that the function of public sphere was to ensure transparency and participation and thus buttress democracy. Even scholars critical of Habermas have accepted that the key role of the public sphere was to provide the communicative preconditions for democracy.[15] Bernhard Peters argued that the notion of the Eu-

9   The concept was introduced by Herminio Martins, „Time and Theory in Sociology," in *Approaches to Sociology: an Introduction to major Trends in British Sociology*, ed. John Rex, International library of sociology (London, 1974), 276 and popularised by Anthony D. Smith, *Nationalism in the Twentieth Century* (London, 1979). 191. For the history of the concept and the recent debate see: Daniel Chernilo, "Methodological nationalism and its critique," in *The SAGE Handbook of Nations and Nationalism*, ed. Gerard Delanty and Krishan Kumar (London, 2006), 129.

10   E.g. Richard Münch, *Das Projekt Europa. Zwischen Nationalstaat, regionaler Autonomie und Weltgesellschaft*, 2 ed. (Frankfurt, 1995). 13f. On the more recent sociological debate: Ulrich Beck, „Europäisierung – Soziologie für das 21. Jahrhundert," *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* 52 (2005): 3f, Neil Fligstein, *Euroclash. The EU, European Identity, and the Future of Europe* (Oxford, 2008). 1f, Hans-Peter Müller, „Auf dem Weg in eine europäische Gesellschaft? Begriffsproblematik und theoretische Perspektiven," *Berliner Journal für Soziologie* 17 (2007): 23f.

11   Klaus Eder and Cathleen Kantner, „Transnationale Resonanzstrukturen in Europa. Eine Kritik der Rede vom Öffentlichkeitsdefizit," in *Die Europäisierung nationaler Gesellschaften*, ed. Maurizio Bach (Opladen, 2000), 307.

12   E.g. Ibid, Marianne van de Steeg, „Rethinking the Conditions for a Public Sphere in Europe," *European Journal of Social Theory* 5 (2002): 501f.

13   Hans-Jörg Trenz, „The European public sphere: contradictory findings in a diverse research field," *European Political Science* 4 (2005): 418.

14   Cf. Habermas' classical study about the decline of the public sphere: Jürgen Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: an Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society* (Cambridge, MA, 1989 [1962]).

15   E.g. Jürgen Gerhards, „Politische Öffentlichkeit. Ein system- und akteurstheoretischer Bestimmungsversuch," in *Öffentlichkeit, Öffentliche Meinung, Soziale Bewegungen. Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie Sonderheft 34.*, ed. Friedhelm Neidhardt (Opladen, 1994), 97f.

ropean public sphere should serve as the yardstick for assessing the empirical phenomena of European public communication and their democratic "quality". Inevitably, the empirical phenomena were bound to remain deficient against this standard. However, the degree of deficiency could serve as a measure.[16] Finally, like many analytical concepts, the term European public sphere has been conveniently used as a generic descriptive term for the empirical reality of European public communication. In order to distinguish the theoretical idea and the analytical model from the empirical findings, in this study the latter shall be described as *European public communication*.[17]

This historical study seeks to address some important lacunae in the existing body of research on the European public sphere in both the social sciences and contemporary history. While social scientists have made various claims which imply change over time, longer-term perspectives and research covering the time period before Maastricht have largely been lacking. Optimistic observers in the debate frequently claimed that there was an "emerging European public sphere",[18] noting that the tacit "permissive consensus" had yielded to a more vivid public debate[19] and that the discourse in the media had set in motion the "democratising dynamics of the European public sphere".[20] By contrast, pessimists argued that European public communication remained deficient and largely confined to national perspectives.[21] For instance, Jürgen Gerhards claimed that the European public sphere has been "lagging behind" the advances of European integration, thus aggravating the democratic deficit.[22] Even though such claims imply a historical perspective, social science research remained limited to the 1990s and 2000s. Nonetheless, it will be impossible to establish the degree of change and the nov-

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16 Bernhard Peters, „Der Sinn von Öffentlichkeit,“ in *Der Sinn von Öffentlichkeit*, ed. Hartmut Wessler (Frankfurt, 2007 [1994]), 67f. Peters' notion of the public sphere as a „normative idealtype" does not exactly match Max Weber's definition of the ideal type. Cf. Max Weber, *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre*, 3 ed. (Tübingen, 1968). 191.

17 Communication is about as elusive a term as the public sphere, however, communication does not carry the same normative overtones. For an overview on the concept of communication see e.g. Roland Burkart, "Kommunikationstheorien," in *Öffentliche Kommunikation. Handbuch der Kommunikations- und Medienwissenschaft*, ed. Günter Bentele, Hans-Bernd Brosius, and Otfried Jarren (Wiesbaden, 2003).

18 Erik Oddvar Eriksen, „An Emerging European Public Sphere,“ *European Journal of Social Theory* 8 (2005), Thomas Risse, An emerging European Public Sphere. Theoretical clarifications and empirical indicators (Paper presented to the European Union Studies Association EUSA, Nashville, TN, March 27–30, 2003).

19 Reiner Grundmann, „The European public sphere and the deficit of democracy,“ in *Whose Europe? The turn towards democracy*, ed. Dennis Smith and Sue Wright (Oxford, 1999), 128–132, Mathias Jopp and Mareike Kleine, „Multiplikatoren europäischer Öffentlichkeit. Die Rolle der europäischen Institutionen,“ in *Europäische Öffentlichkeit*, ed. Claudio Franzius and Ulrich K. Preuß (Baden-Baden, 2004), 249.

20 Hans-Jörg Trenz and Klaus Eder, „The democratizing dynamics of a European public sphere. Towards a theory of democratic functionalism,“ *European Journal of Social Theory* 7 (2004).

21 E.g. Jürgen Gerhards, „Europäisierung von Ökonomie und Politik und die Trägheit der Entstehung einer europäischen Öffentlichkeit,“ in *Die Europäisierung nationaler Gesellschaften*, ed. Maurizio Bach (Opladen, 2000), 294–296.

22 Ibid, Jürgen Gerhards, „Westeuropäische Integration und die Schwierigkeiten der Entstehung einer europäischen Öffentlichkeit,“ *Zeitschrift für Soziologie* 22 (1993), Christoph O. Meyer, „Political Legitimacy and the Invisibility of Politics: Exploring the European Union's Communication Deficit,“ *Journal of Common Market Studies* 37 (1999).

elty of phenomena under investigation here if information on European public communication in the immediately-preceding period is conspicuously absent. Consequently, this study will enquire into public communication during the time period up to Maastricht, in order to complement the research and the debate in the social sciences.

At the same time, this inquiry will make a contribution in two areas historians of postwar Europe have frequently discussed, but where empirical research has remained very limited so far. First, social historians have acknowledged the importance of the question of an emerging European society in the second half of the 20th century,[23]discussing in particular the role of European civil society[24] and the European public sphere.[25] Nevertheless, the existing historical works mainly consist of conceptual or historical overviews that rely heavily on secondary literature.[26] A properly systematic historical inquiry into political communication as a reflection of a European public sphere has thus been lacking so far.[27]

Secondly, historians of European integration have recently started to re-examine the period from the summit of The Hague in 1969 to the relaunch of European integration from the mid-1980s. While traditional interpretations[28] tended to dismiss this period as the "dark ages"[29] of European integration, a group of historians led by Franz Knipping and Matthias Schönwald have called for a re-evaluation of this approach. According to this view, the political achievements of Europe's "second generation" in the 1970s and early 1980s deserved more attention.[30] They argue that in the wake of the summit of The Hague the Community had established its own resources, and that subsequent sectoral expansion into further new policy areas such as the environment and the successive enlargements should

23   Hartmut Kaelble, „Eine europäische Gesellschaft," in *Europawissenschaft*, ed. Gunnar Folke Schuppert, Ingolf Pernice, and Ulrich R. Haltern (Baden-Baden, 2005), Hartmut Kaelble, *Sozialgeschichte Europas: 1945 bis zur Gegenwart* (München, 2007).

24   Hartmut Kaelble, „Gibt es eine europäische Zivilgesellschaft?," in *Zivilgesellschaft – national und transnational. WZB-Jahrbuch 2003*, ed. Dieter Gosewinkel, et al. (Berlin, 2004), Jürgen Kocka, „Civil society from a historical perspective," *European Review* 12 (2004), Jürgen Kocka, „Eine stille Zivilgesellschaft entsteht," *Neue Gesellschaft/Frankfurter Hefte* 54 (2007).

25   Hartmut Kaelble, „The Historical Rise of a European Public Sphere," *Journal of European Integration History* 8 (2002), Jörg Requate and Martin Schulze-Wessel, eds., *Europäische Öffentlichkeit. Transnationale Kommunikation seit dem 18. Jahrhundert* (Frankfurt, New York, 2002).

26   Hartmut Kaelble, *Europäer über Europa. Die Entstehung des europäischen Selbstverständnisses im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert* (Frankfurt, 2001), Hartmut Kaelble, „Europäisches Selbstverständnis und gesellschaftliche Entwicklungen im 20. Jahrhundert," in *Selbstverständnis und Gesellschaft der Europäer. Aspekte der sozialen und kulturellen Europäisierung im späten 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*, ed. Hartmut Kaelble and Martin Kirsch (Frankfurt, 2008).

27   Jan-Henrik Meyer, „Europäische Öffentlichkeit aus historischer Sicht," in *Europäische Öffentlichkeit*, ed. Ulrich K. Preuß and Claudio Franzius (Baden-Baden, 2004).

28   For the textbook view: Ian Bache and Stephen George, *Politics in the European Union. Second Edition* (Oxford, 2006). 138–146.

29   Robert O. Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann, „Institutional Change in Europe in the 1980s," in *The New European Community. Decisionmaking and Institutional Change*, ed. Robert O. Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann (Boulder, 1991), 8.

30   Franz Knipping, *Rom, 25. März 1957: die Einigung Europas* (München, 2004). 156, Franz Knipping and Matthias Schönwald, „Vorwort," in *Aufbruch zum Europa der zweiten Generation: die europäische Einigung 1969–1984*, ed. Franz Knipping and Matthias Schönwald (Trier, 2004), ix. They quote a speech by Gaston Thorn in 1981 for this expression. The term however dates back to 1969: Pierre Drouin, "Le Nerf de l'Europe," *Le Monde*, 27 November 1969, Hans-Josef Strick, "In die zweite Generation," *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 29 November 1969.

also be acknowledged as considerable advances in European integration.[31] Arguably, the EC has succeeded in turning itself into a supranational polity with its own institutions and policies.[32] How European public communication responded to these changes in European integration during this period remains as yet unexplored.

Focusing on the period between 1969 and 1991, this study will provide the first systematic historical evidence of European public communication from a longer term perspective. It will thus contribute to current research agendas both in the social sciences and in history. Informed by the interdisciplinary debate on the European public sphere, the first goal of this study is to trace continuity and change in the structure of European public communication between 1969 and 1991, in order to place current research in the social sciences in an historical perspective. How do the findings of the period between 1969 and 1991 relate to the results of research relating to more recent years?

The second goal is to provide insight into the previously unexplored history of the European public sphere in the two decades before Maastricht. How did European public communication evolve? Did European public communication actually lag behind the advances of European integration as Gerhards has claimed? Was media coverage constantly low and even declining during these decades, as he assumed?[33] Which conclusions can be drawn with respect to the debate about "Europe's second generation"? Does the evidence of European public communication in the 1970s and 1980s suggest that these were the "dark ages" of the European public sphere or rather Europe's "second generation"?[34]

The third goal is trying to make use of one of the core advantages of historical inquiry. Historical research usually places great emphasis on taking various aspects of context into account. I will thus be considering the long-term context of European integration, the short-term context of the events that were chosen as case studies, the traditions of national discourses on Europe and the conditions of the media and reporting on European integration. By systematically linking these various aspects of context to the structure and content of European public communication, it will be possible to draw some tentative conclusions as to what explains the development.

The fourth and final goal is to discuss the implications of these findings for the debate on European democracy. In the remaining part of this introduction I shall briefly explain how the concept of the public sphere has been adapted to research on the European public sphere. Furthermore, I will present the main findings of the ever-growing body of research and sketch the main axes of my own research its temporal and spatial scope, the sources I will use and the organisation of my study.

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31   Knipping and Schönwald, „Vorwort," ix.
32   Wolfram Kaiser, Morten Rasmussen, and Brigitte Leucht, eds., *The History of the European Union. Origins of a Trans- and Supranational Polity 1950–72* (London, 2009).
33   Gerhards, „Europäisierung von Ökonomie und Politik und die Trägheit der Entstehung einer europäischen Öffentlichkeit," 294–296.
34   The answer to this question has to remain provisional. A comprehensive treatment would require a comparison with the period before 1969.

1.2 What is the European public sphere?

The public sphere is conceived as an arena of communication in respect of all is-
sues of public concern, particularly political and societal affairs. This arena is to be
a public one that is visible, audible and accessible to all. It is meant to provide a
space independent of the state in which society can discuss its own affairs. At the
same time, it is the place where government, civil society and citizens communi-
cate with each other. An independent public sphere is a central precondition for
democracy, because it provides a forum in which opinions are formed.[35] For ana-
lytical purposes, different levels of the public sphere have been distinguished.
Public spheres of *encounters*, of *assemblies* and of the *media* are distinct in their im-
mediacy, their scope and the opportunity for participation they provide. A general
rule applies: The wider the potential audience, the more restricted the access to ac-
tive participation and the more institutionalised the procedures for selecting who
gets to voice his or her views. Despite such systematic restrictions, the public
sphere of the media is the key arena for opinion formation in modern mass socie-
ties, because it manages to reach a large share of the population.[36] Consequently,
this study focuses on the European public sphere of the media. Nonetheless, me-
dia-based public communication largely takes place as communication between
different actors and mediators that is only observed by the public as an audi-
ence.[37]

   The public sphere is the space between state and society in which citizens and
policy makers are able to form an opinion on political and societal issues. Opinion
formation requires *transparency.* In order to ensure transparency, access to ideas
and for participants must be open and equal. In the debate in the public sphere the
relevance of opinions and the advantages and disadvantages of ideas are discussed
and evaluated. As a consequence, citizens and policy makers find *orientation* in
relation to various issues, ideas and opinions, and can eventually form their own
opinions.[38] Furthermore, the public sphere serves to hold political actors account-
able. At the same time, it is the place for debates on the self-understanding of soci-
ety and the legitimacy of the polity.

   As an "intermediary system"[39] between state and society, the public sphere is
linked to the polity that makes binding decisions for society.[40] *I will hence define the
European public sphere as the political public sphere[41] that links the European citizens in*

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35   Jürgen Gerhards and Friedhelm Neidhardt, „Strukturen und Funktionen moderner Öffentlich-
     keit. Fragestellungen und Ansätze," in *Öffentlichkeit, Kultur, Massenkommunikation. Beiträge zur
     Medienkommunikationssoziologie*, ed. Stefan Müller-Dohm and Klaus Neumann-Braun (Olden-
     burg, 1991), 39–41.
36   Ibid., 49–56.
37   Friedhelm Neidhardt, „Öffentlichkeit, Öffentliche Meinung und soziale Bewegungen," in *Öf-
     fentlichkeit, Öffentliche Meinung, Soziale Bewegungen. Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsy-
     chologie Sonderheft 34.*, ed. Friedhelm Neidhardt (Opladen, 1994), 7.
38   Ibid., 8f.
39   Gerhards and Neidhardt, „Strukturen und Funktionen moderner Öffentlichkeit," 39.
40   Of course, what takes place in the public sphere is also relevant for the realms of the economy,
     culture and other aspects of society. However, I am focusing on a *political* public sphere, which
     discusses issues of political relevance and which takes the political system as its point of refer-
     ence.
41   Habermas, „Remarks on Dieter Grimm's ‚Does Europe need a constitution?'," 306.

their public communication to the political system of the EC/EU. In other words, it is the sphere of communication in which the European polity is the point of reference, the explicit or implicit addressee of communication.[42]

The concept of a European public sphere as a political public sphere – juxtaposed to the emerging European polity – may appear increasingly anachronistic the further back in time we go. Even though the EC only slowly acquired the broader range of powers that turned it into a supranational polity, from its inception the EC was already more integrated than traditional international intergovernmental organisations. Institutional choices, such as the supranational Commission, majority decisions in the Council of Ministers as a basic principle and the goal to establish a directly elected European assembly, are cases in point.[43] Particularly in light of the creation of its own resources in 1969, the EC can arguably be considered an *emerging* supranational polity. Even though the apparent absence of a European public sphere was only perceived as a problem in the period after Maastricht, it still makes sense to explore the history of the European public sphere in a longer term perspective. Clearly, the democratic deficit that the European public sphere was expected to alleviate mainly arose as a consequence of wider EC competences and the introduction of majority voting with the Single European Act. Nevertheless, only by taking a longer term perspective it is possible to elucidate a historical process of emergence[44] and elicit those structural patterns of European public communication that may account for its apparent inertia. Extending the concept of the public sphere to the European level requires the inclusion of two sets of criteria: its democratic quality and its European scope. First, how does European public communication contribute to European democracy? Secondly, how does European public communication actually ensure the inclusion of the Europeans across national borders and connect them to the emerging European polity?

1.2.1 Democratic quality

Various benchmarks for assessing the quality of public communication have been suggested, depending on the underlying normative model of the public sphere. While the *liberal-representative* model focuses on transparency and accountability, the *discursive* model is more demanding. In a discursive public sphere, participation should involve civil society: A rational mode of arguing will ensure the "discursive quality" of communication.[45] In this study I will take note of two normative principles that Bernhard Peters has suggested as key.[46] Together they ensure

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42 Klaus Eder, „Zur Transformation nationalstaatlicher Öffentlichkeit in Europa. Von der Sprachgemeinschaft zur issuespezifischen Kommunikationsgemeinschaft," *Berliner Journal für Soziologie* 10 (2000): 181.

43 Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Rome, 25 March 1957, (Treaty establishing the European Economic Community and connected documents, 5–183, Publishing Services of the European Communities, Luxembourg), articles 138.3 & 148.

44 Klaus Eder and Cathleen Kantner, „Interdiskursivität in der europäischen Öffentlichkeit," *Berliner Debatte Initial* 13 (2002): 85.

45 Jürgen Gerhards, „Diskursive versus liberale Öffentlichkeit. Eine empirische Auseinandersetzung mit Jürgen Habermas," *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie* 49 (1997): 4–12.

46 Peters, „Der Sinn von Öffentlichkeit," 67f.

transparency and are a necessary precondition for the formation of public opinion. First, the public sphere should be *open* to a diversity of views and opinions. Secondly, the principle of *equality* demands that participation should be as broad and diverse as possible. In the public sphere of the media, there are various limitations to openness and equal participation. Nevertheless, these principles may serve as a normative yardstick for the analysis of public communication.

1.2.2 European scope

The European public sphere differs from national and international public spheres with respect to the political space it refers to. Historians who dealt with the European public sphere tended to treat Europe as a geographical concept. Exploring transnational communication, they included countries from Eastern as well as Western Europe.[47] In this study, however, I have focused on the political European public sphere. For this reason, the institutional point of reference is the EC as a political entity, rather than as an ensemble of European countries. Two criteria may be used to define the European scope of the public sphere: its contents or its structure.

The first and defining criterion of a political European public sphere is that it is the arena of communication in which the *European polity is the point of reference.* It is the place where actors address and refer to European institutions and discuss their actions and policies. Eder has argued that the European public sphere emerges at the moment when European institutions are at the origin of public communication, are the addressees or the object of communication.[48] Thus, at the most basic level, the European public sphere encompasses all public communication in relation to European politics and policy-making in which the institutions of the European polity are explicitly or implicitly addressed or referred to. The European public sphere can hence be defined by its *content*.

A second criterion requires that the *structure of communication* is also of European scope, including communication across intra-European borders. Two different indicators have been used: The *synchronicity of issues* and evidence of *transnational communication*.[49] First, based on a remark by Habermas,[50] Klaus Eder and Cathleen Kantner argued that the *synchronicity of issues* across media from different European countries demonstrated that the structure of communication was of European scope. A European public sphere hence required that "*the same issues* [were discussed] *at the same time using the same criteria of relevance*".[51] The synchronicity of issues meant a discursive integration of the public sphere across Europe.

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47   Requate and Schulze-Wessel, eds., *Europäische Öffentlichkeit.*

48   Eder, „Zur Transformation nationalstaatlicher Öffentlichkeit in Europa," 181.

49   The term transnational refers to interaction between groups, organisations, states and individuals across national borders, while the term international exclusively refers to inter-state relations. Hartmut Kaelble, Martin Kirsch, and Alexander Schmidt-Gernig, "Zur Entwicklung transnationaler Öffentlichkeiten und Identitäten im 20. Jahrhundert. Eine Einleitung," in *Transnationale Öffentlichkeiten und Identitäten im 20. Jahrhundert*, ed. Hartmut Kaelble, Martin Kirsch, and Alexander Schmidt-Gernig (Frankfurt, 2002), 9.

50   Habermas, „Remarks on Dieter Grimm's ‚Does Europe need a constitution?'," 306.

51   Eder and Kantner, „Transnationale Resonanzstrukturen in Europa," 315. Translation by Risse, An emerging European Public Sphere, 6.

This was intended to ensure that actors and audiences across Europe were not only aware of the motivations of their European partners but were also able to argue with them about their reasons for action.[52] However, other researchers have challenged the assumption that a synchronous debate necessarily meant that there was communication across national borders.[53]

For Marianne van de Steeg public communication should not only be synchronous, but also involve actual *transnational communication*. Only a substantial level of actual exchange across borders ensured that the discussion of the same issues did not take place within essentially separate national public spheres. It was thus necessary to examine the evidence of exchange processes and transfers. However, transnational communication is very difficult to research empirically, because the flow of ideas often remains invisible.[54] In order to explore exchanges across borders, it is necessary to inquire into the *mediators*, such as correspondents and journalists who act as "cultural brokers".[55] These are pivotal actors in the enabling of transnational communication.[56] Additionally, *transnational references*, namely those that arise in the discussion of the political views of foreign actors, provide a good indication of the intensity of transnational debate. This is arguably the closest approximation of a transnational debate that can be found when studying the media.[57]

Finally, the European public sphere is not only a structure of communication, but also a sphere of action. Actors discuss, negotiate, and discursively construct Europe's self-understanding. Various researchers have argued that increased transnational communication will have consequences for how the transnational political space in Europe is imagined.[58] Expecting a shift or an extension of identification to the European level, they have treated "European identification" as a criterion that indicates a transnational European public sphere.[59] Such assumptions require additional theoretical reconsideration. Still, it remains essential to study the European public sphere "at work" by examining the discursive construction of

52 Friedhelm Neidhardt, „Europäische Öffentlichkeit als Prozess," in *Europäische Öffentlichkeit und medialer Wandel: Eine transdisziplinäre Perspektive*, ed. Wolfgang R. Langenbucher and Michael Latzer (Wiesbaden, 2006), 52.

53 Eder and Kantner, „Interdiskursivität in der europäischen Öffentlichkeit," 82–84.

54 Marianne van de Steeg, „The public sphere in the European Union: a media analysis of public discourse on EU enlargement and on the Haider case" (PhD thesis, European University Institute, 2005). 27–30.

55 Wolfram Kaiser, „Transnational Network Governance. The Informal Politics of European Integration," in *The History of the European Union. Origins of a Trans- and Supranational Polity 1950–72*, ed. Wolfram Kaiser, Morten Rasmussen, and Brigitte Leucht (London, 2009), Jan-Henrik Meyer, "Tracing Transnational Communication in the European public sphere: the Summit of The Hague 1969," in *The History of the European Union. Origins of a Trans- and Supranational Polity 1950–72*, ed. Wolfram Kaiser, Morten Rasmussen, and Brigitte Leucht (London, 2009).

56 Neidhardt, „Europäische Öffentlichkeit als Prozess," 54f.

57 Andreas Wimmel, „Transnationale Diskurse. Zur Analyse politischer Kommunikation in der europäischen Medienöffentlichkeit," *Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen* 11 (2004).

58 Kaelble, Kirsch, and Schmidt-Gernig, „Zur Entwicklung transnationaler Öffentlichkeiten und Identitäten im 20. Jahrhundert. Eine Einleitung," 10.

59 E.g. Bernhard Peters et al., „National and transnational public spheres. The Case of the EU," in *Transformations of the state*, ed. Stephan Leibfried and Michael Zürn (Cambridge, 2005), 147, Thomas Risse, "Auf dem Weg zu einer europäischen Kommunikationsgemeinschaft: Theoretische Überlegungen und empirische Evidenz," in *Europäische Öffentlichkeit*, ed. Ulrich K. Preuß and Claudio Franzius (Baden-Baden, 2004), 148–150.

European self-understanding. Based on these definitions I will explore five charac-
teristics of the European public sphere in an analysis of media content during the
period between 1969 and 1991.

Five research questions for the analysis of European public communication

1. *European polity as a point of reference: Did the European polity increasingly be-
    come a point of reference, improving transparency in respect of European affairs?*
2. *Synchronicity: Were the same issues increasingly discussed at the same time at the
    same level of relevance?*
3. *Mediators' transnational involvement: Did the structure of mediators change in a
    way that suggests increased transnational communication and broader participa-
    tion?*
4. *Transnational communication: Is there an indication of growing transnational
    communication and an increasingly diverse range of actors covered?*
5. *European self-understanding: Is there evidence of a common conceptualisation of
    the European political space? Was there growing European identification, a Euro-
    pean sense of community?*

These questions will guide the analysis of European public communication in this
study. However, what are the findings of the recent wave of European public
sphere research concerning these five issues?

1.3 What do we empirically know about the European public sphere to date?

The body of knowledge relating to European public communication has been rap-
idly expanding in recent years. Most research projects limit themselves to the pub-
lic sphere of the media.[60] In what follows, I will provide a brief overview of this
research, considering the types of media studied, the different designs of the stud-
ies and their temporal scope, before presenting recent findings concerning change
over time.[61]

While there has been occasional research on transnational European media,[62]
most studies have compared national media across a number of European coun-

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60   Juan Díez Medrano also attempts to consider the public sphere of encounters. Juan Díez Me-
     drano, *Framing Europe: attitudes to European integration in Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom*
     (Princeton, N.J., 2003). 16–19. The public sphere of assemblies has been touched upon by protest
     research and research on European civil society, e.g. Hans-Jörg Trenz, *Zur Konstitution politischer
     Öffentlichkeit in der Europäischen Union. Zivilgesellschaftliche Subpolitik oder schaupolitische Inszenie-
     rung?* (Baden-Baden, 2002).
61   For a more general overview of the results of European public sphere research cf. Marcel Ma-
     chill, Markus Beiler, and Corinna Fischer, „Europe-Topics in Europe's Media," *European Journal
     of Communication* 21 (2006), Jan-Henrik Meyer, „Gibt es eine Europäische Öffentlichkeit? Neuere
     empirische Studien zu Demokratiedefizit, Legitimation und Kontrolle in Europa," *Berliner Jour-
     nal für Soziologie* 14 (2004): 141–148, Hans-Jörg Trenz, „European Dilemmas. The European Pub-
     lic Sphere. Contradictory Findings in a diverse Research Field," *European Political Science* 4
     (2005).
62   E.g. Olivier Baisnée and Dominique Marchetti, „La production de l'information „européenne".
     Le cas de la chaîne paneuropéenne d'information Euronews," in *En quête d'Europe: médias euro-*

tries. Most research projects have focused on national broadsheet newspapers, which devote ample attention to national and international politics and the economy. As opinion leaders they are the central point of reference for other media in the national context.[63] News magazines,[64] regional[65] and tabloid newspapers[66] have been less frequently considered. Researchers from media studies have contributed some analyses of television.[67] A number of studies have also combined various print and audio-visual media in order to arrive at a comprehensive over-

péens et médiatisation de l'Europe, ed. Dominique Marchetti (Rennes, 2004), Michael Brüggemann and Hagen Schulz-Forberg, «Spearheads of Transnationalization? Cross-border Media in Europe,» in *The Transnationalization of Public Spheres*, ed. Bernhard Peters, et al. (Basingstoke, 2008). About their failure: Erik Neveu, "Europe as an 'Un-imaginable Community'. The Failure of the French Newsmagazine L'Européen," *Journal of European Area Studies* 10 (2002).

63 For a critique: Trenz, „European Dilemmas. The European Public Sphere. Contradictory Findings in a diverse Research Field,» 410.

64 Holger Sievert, *Europäischer Journalismus. Theorie und Empirie aktueller Medienkommunikation in der Europäischen Union* (Opladen, 1998), Marianne van de Steeg, "Analysis of the Dutch and Spanish Newspaper Debates on EU enlargement with Central and Eastern European Countries. Suggestions for a Transnational European Public Sphere," in *Transnational Communication in Europe. Practice and Research*, ed. Barbara Baerns and Juliana Raupp (Berlin, 2000).

65 Verena Boos, „Bypassing regional identity: a study of identifications and interests in Scottish and Catalan press commentary on European integration, 1973–1993" (PhD, European University Institute, 2005), Roselyne Ringoot and Jean-Michel Utard, „L'Europe vue par la presse régionale. Les exemple comparés de Ouest-France et des Dernières Nouvelles d'Alsace," in *En quête d'Europe: médias européens et médiatisation de l'Europe*, ed. Dominique Marchetti (Rennes, 2004), Regina Vetters, «Vor Ort in Europa: ein Vergleich der EU-Berichterstattung deutscher Qualitäts- und Regionalzeitungen,» *Medien & Kommunikationswissenschaft* 55 (2007).

66 Peter J. Anderson and Tony Weymouth, *Insulting the public? The British press and the European Union* (London, 1999), Robin B. Hodess, "News Coverage of European Politics. A Comparison of Change in Britain and Germany," in *Europapolitische Grundverständnisse im Wandel. Analysen und Konsequenzen für die politische Bildung*, ed. Mathias Jopp, Andreas Maurer, and Heinrich Schneider (Bonn, 1998), Gerlinde Mautner, *Der britische Europa-Diskurs. Methodenreflexion und Fallstudien zur Berichterstattung in der Tagespresse* (Wien, 2000). 57.

67 Baisnée and Marchetti, „La production de l'information „européenne". Le cas de la chaîne paneuropéenne d'information Euronews.", Eric Darras and Dominique Marchetti, „La production et la circulation des images „européennes". L'exemple des échanges des sujets d'actualité de l'Union européenne de radio-télévision," in *En quête d'Europe: médias européens et médiatisation de l'Europe*, ed. Dominique Marchetti (Rennes, 2004), Neil T. Gavin, «Imagining Europe: Political Identity and British Television Coverage of the European Economy,» *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 2 (2000), Neil T. Gavin, «L'euro, la télévision et l'espace public européen: L'exemple britannique,» in *L'Union européenne et les médias. Regards croisés sur l'information européenne*, ed. Guillaume Garcia and Virginie Le Torrec, Cahiers politiques (Paris, 2003), Hodess, «News Coverage of European Politics. A Comparison of Change in Britain and Germany.», Deirdre Kevin, *Europe in the Media. A Comparison of Reporting, Representation, and Rhetoric in National Media Systems in Europe* (Mahwah, N.J., London, 2003). 55f., 133–165, Edmund Lauf and Jochen Peter, "EU-Repräsentationen in Fernsehnachrichten. Eine Analyse ihrer Präsenz in 13 EU-Mitgliedstaaten vor der Europawahl 1999," in *Europäische Union und mediale Öffentlichkeit. Theoretische Befunde und Perspektiven zur Rolle der Medien im europäischen Einigungsprozess*, ed. Lutz Hagen (Köln, 2004), Jochen Peter, „Kaum vorhanden, thematisch homogen und eher negativ – Die alltägliche Fernsehberichterstattung über die Europäische Union im internationalen Vergleich," in *Europäische Union und mediale Öffentlichkeit. Theoretische Befunde und Perspektiven zur Rolle der Medien im europäischen Einigungsprozess*, ed. Lutz Hagen (Köln, 2004), Holli A. Semetko and Patti M. Valkenburg, „Framing European politics: a content analysis of press and television news," *Journal of Communication* 50 (2000), Anna Triandafyllidou, "Research Note: The Launch of the Euro in the Italian Media: Representations of Political and Economic Integration," *European Journal of Communication* 18 (2003).

view of "Europe in the media".[68] Great hopes had been attached to the internet as a novel transnational medium. Nevertheless, research has demonstrated that the internet has largely reproduced national patterns of conventional media usage.[69]

Researchers have used three distinct designs for case selection, covering different modes of political communication. While "normal" or "routine" political communication comprises the day-to-day coverage of political affairs, "crisis communication" (*Krisenkommunikation*) describes exceptionally intense debates that arise whenever major political, societal or moral questions are at stake.[70] Studies based on *representative samples* from a given time period mainly cover routine communication,[71] enabling researchers to capture and compare the average level and structure of coverage. Other studies follow the *debates* on certain (European) issues. If the debates are observed for a longer period of time, this design consists of both routine and crisis communication.[72] There has also been research on the debates on Eastern enlargement,[73] Turkish accession,[74] European security policy,[75]

68 Kevin, *Europe in the Media.* 54–59. She analyses tabloid, broadsheet and regional press, private and public television.

69 Hagen Schulz-Forberg, „Report on the Role of the Internet as a Medium of Communication with a View to assessing its Contribution in the Development of a European Public Sphere," in *EMEDIATE: Media and Ethics of a European Public Sphere from the Treaty of Rome to the 'War on Terror'* (Florence, 2006), 15–19. See also: Ruud Koopmans and Ann Zimmermann, Internet: A New Potential for European Political Communication? (Discussion Paper. Wissenschaftszentrum für Sozialforschung Berlin, 2003), Susan O'Donnell, "Analysing the internet and the public sphere. The case of ‚Womenslink'," *Javnost. The Public* 8 (2002), Renée van Os and Nicholas W. Jankowski, "An online European Public Sphere? The Web and Europeanization of Political Communication in the EU," in *A European Public Sphere. How much of it do we have and how much do we need?*, ed. Claes H. de Vreese and Hermann Schmitt (Mannheim, 2007), Ann Zimmermann, Demokratisierung und Europäisierung Online? Massenmediale politische Öffentlichkeit im Internet (PhD thesis, Institut für Soziologie, Freie Universität Berlin, 2006), Ann Zimmermann, "Online-Öffentlichkeiten als Gegenstand empirischer Forschung," *Berliner Journal für Soziologie* 17 (2007).

70 Eder and Kantner, „Interdiskursivität in der europäischen Öffentlichkeit," 86. Their distinction is based on Jürgen Habermas, *Faktizität und Geltung. Beiträge zur Diskurstheorie des Rechts und des demokratischen Rechtsstaats* (Frankfurt, 1992). 432f, Bernhard Peters, „Recht, Staat und politische Öffentlichkeit als Formen sozialer Selbstorganisation," in *Der Sinn von Öffentlichkeit*, ed. Hartmut Wessler (Frankfurt, 2007 [1993]), 48–51.

71 Peters et al., „National and transnational public spheres," 142, Hans-Jörg Trenz, *Europa in den Medien. Die europäische Integration im Spiegel nationaler Öffentlichkeit* (Frankfurt, 2005). 180–186.

72 The EUROPUB project compared the coverage of different policy areas: Ruud Koopmans and Paul Statham, The Transformation of Political Mobilisation and Communication in European Public Spheres. A Research Outline (EUROPUB, 18 February 2002), 19f.

73 Christine Landfried, „Das Entstehen einer europäischen Öffentlichkeit," in *Europäische Öffentlichkeit*, ed. Ulrich K. Preuß und Claudio Franzius (Baden-Baden, 2004), 134f, Steeg, „Analysis of the Dutch and Spanish Newspaper Debates on EU enlargement with Central and Eastern European Countries." For the debate in the accession countries see: Markus Poll, *Im Dreieck von Öffentlichkeit, Massenkommunikation und politischer Kultur. Die osteuropäischen Beitrittskandidaten auf dem Weg in die EU* (Berlin, 2001).

74 Andreas Wimmel, Beyond the Bosphorus. Comparing German, French and British Discourses on Turkey's Application to Join the European Union (IHS Institute for Advanced Studies Vienna, 2006), Andreas Wimmel, *Transnationale Diskurse in Europa. Der Streit um den Türkei-Beitritt in Deutschland, Frankreich und Großbritannien* (Frankfurt, 2006).

75 Cathleen Kantner and Swantje Renfordt, „Public Debates on Humanitarian and Military Interventions in Europe and the U.S. (1990–2005)" (paper presented at the 4th ECPR General Conference, 6–8 September 2007, Pisa, 2007), Antje Knorr, Europäische Öffentlichkeit und transnationale Kommunikation im sicherheitspolitischen Bereich [PhD thesis] (Freie Universität Berlin,

economic policy,[76] agricultural policy and institutional reform[77] and even the problems of biotechnology policy and other environmental risks.[78] The debates centred around the European Constitutional Convention and the process of Constitution Making in 2001–2003 as well as the ensuing ratification phase have been covered in a vast number of research projects.[79] A third type of analysis focuses on crisis communication pure and simple. These studies target debates that follow a singular *event* considered to be of the highest European relevance. Cases in point are the

2006), Mary Martin, „Re-imagining a European public sphere. Discursive constructions of the ‚War on Terrorism' in Britain and Germany, 2001–2002" (PhD thesis, University of Cambridge, 2004), Swantje Renfordt, *Auf dem Weg zu einer europäischen Öffentlichkeit? – Eine Mediananalyse europäischer und amerikanischer Debatten über den Irak-Krieg 2003* (Saarbrücken, 2007), Thomas Risse and Jana Katharina Grabowsky, European Identity Formation in the Public Sphere and in Foreign Policy (Recon Online Working Paper 08 / 04, 2008), Hartmut Wessler et al., „Together we Fight? Piecemeal Europeanization in the Public Discourse on Military Interventions" (paper presented at the First European Communication Conference, Amsterdam, 24–26 November, 2005).

76 Christoph O. Meyer, „The Europeanization of Media Discourse: A Study of Quality Press Coverage of Economic Policy Co-ordination since Amsterdam," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 43 (2005).

77 Barbara Berkel, *Konflikt als Motor europäischer Öffentlichkeit. Eine Inhaltsanalyse von Tageszeitungen in Deutschland, Frankreich, Großbritannien und Österreich* (Wiesbaden, 2006).

78 Irene Neverla, „The Birth of a European Public Sphere through European Media Reporting of Risk Communication," *European Societies* 9 (2007), Franz Seifert, Synchronised National Publics as Functional Equivalent of an Integrated European Public. The Case of Biotechnology (European Integration online Papers (EIoP) 10, 2006).

79 Sebastian Esser, *Europas Suche nach einer gemeinsamen Öffentlichkeit: Eine Inhaltsanalyse der Debatte über eine EU-Verfassung in europäischen Tageszeitungen* (Marburg, 2005), Eric Jentges, Hans-Jörg Trenz, and Regina Vetters, „Von der politischen zur sozialen Konstitutionalisierung Europas. Verfassungsgebung als Katalysator europäischer Vergesellschaftung?," *Politische Vierteljahresschrift* 48 (2007), Sebastian Kurpas, *Der Europäische Reformkonvent im Spiegel der Qualitätspresse. Beispiel einer europäischen Öffentlichkeit?* (Baden-Baden, 2008), Amelie Kutter, „Petitioner or Partner? Constructions of European Integration in Polish Print Media Debates on the EU Constitutional Treaty," in *Discourse and Contemporary Social Change*, ed. Giuseppina Cortese, Norman Fairclough, and Patrizia Ardizzone (Bern, 2007), Landfried, "Das Entstehen einer europäischen Öffentlichkeit.", Ulrike Liebert, "Introduction: Structuring political conflict about Europe: National media in transnational discourse analysis," *Perspectives on European Politics and Society* 8 (2007), Christoph O. Meyer, The Constitutional Treaty Debates as Revelatory Mechanisms. Insights for Public Sphere Research and Re-Launch Attempts (Recon Online Working Paper 07 / 06, 2007), Jan-Henrik Meyer, "(De-)Constructing legitimacy in the European public sphere. German, French and British newspaper comments on the "Constitution" summit 2004," in *Europe in its Making*, ed. Silvia Marton (Bucharest, 2006), Florian Oberhuber, Legitimating the European Union: The Contested Meanings of an EU Constitution (EUI Working Papers 2007/25, 2007), Florian Oberhuber et al., "Debating the European Constitution: On representations of Europe / the EU in the press," *Journal of Language and Politics* 4 (2005), Kathrin Packham, "Motor einer europäischen Öffentlichkeit. Der Konvent in der Medienberichterstattung der Mitgliedstaaten," in *Verfassungsexperiment. Europa auf dem Weg zur transnationalen Demokratie*, ed. Ulrike Liebert, et al. (Münster, 2003), Stefan Seidendorf, „Geschichtlichkeit und Gemeinschaftsumwelt – Was strukturiert den Konstitutionalisierungsprozess?," in *Die Europäische Union auf dem Weg in den Verfassungsstaat*, ed. Frank Schimmelpfennig and Berthold Rittberger, MZES-Jahrbuch 10 (Frankfurt, 2006), Regina Vetters, „Konvent + Verfassung = Öffentlichkeit. Momente europäischer Öffentlichkeit in der Berichterstattung deutscher, britischer und französischer Printmedien zur Verfassungsdebatte" (PhD, Freie Universität Berlin, 2007), Regina Vetters, Eric Jentges, and Hans-Jörg Trenz, „Exploring the EU's social constituency: Patterns of public claims-making in constitutional debates in France and Germany," *ARENA Working Paper* 06 (2006).

BSE scandal in 1996,[80] the "Haider affair", i.e. the "sanctions" against the Austrian government in 2000,[81] the "Prodi affair", namely, suspicions as to Commission President Prodi's lack of leadership in 2001,[82] or the "Berlusconi-Schulz-case", when Italian Premier Silvio Berlusconi compared the German Social Democrat MEP Martin Schulz to a *kapo*[83] in June 2003.[84] The singular event of the introduction of the Euro was also studied[85] as were recurrent events such as European Councils[86] and European Parliament elections.[87]

Almost all of the studies focus on the 1990s and early 2000s. Even though researchers like Hans-Jörg Trenz have highlighted that "only a longitudinal survey with systematic time-series data […] could sustain the thesis of the Europeanisation of political communication",[88] cross-time data remain limited. Only two research projects include cases from the 1980s, namely Robin Hodess' comparison of the summits in the context of the SEA 1985 and Maastricht 1990–91 and Bernhard Peters' project on the "Transnationalisation of the public sphere" project (1982 and

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80   Rod Brookes, „Newspapers and national identity: the BSE / CJD crisis and the British press," *Media, Culture & Society* 21 (1999), Grundmann, "The European public sphere and the deficit of democracy," 41f, Christoph O. Meyer, *Europäische Öffentlichkeit als Kontrollsphäre. Die europäische Kommission, die Medien und politische Verantwortung* (Berlin, 2002). 98–105.

81   Barbara Berkel, „Political Parallelism in News and Commentaries on the Haider Conflict. A Comparative Analysis of Austrian, British, German, and French Quality Newspapers," *Communications. The European Journal of Communication Research* 31 (2006), Stefan Seidendorf, "Defining Europe against its Past? – Memory Politics and the Sanctions against Austria in France and Germany," *German Law Journal* 6 (2005), Marianne van de Steeg, "Does a public sphere exist in the EU? An analysis of the content of the debate on the Haider case," *European Journal for Political Research* 45 (2006).

82   Hans-Jörg Trenz, „Ein Rauschen geht durch den Blätterwald. EU-Präsident Prodi und die Entstehung einer europäischen Publizistik," *Berliner Debatte Initial* 13 (2002).

83   I.e. a prison guard in a concentration camp.

84   John Downey and Thomas Koenig, „Is There a European Public Sphere?: The Berlusconi–Schulz Case," *European Journal of Communication* 21 (2006).

85   Gavin, „L'euro, la télévision et l'espace public européen.", Holli A. Semetko, Claes H. de Vrees, and Jochen Peter, «Europeanised Politics, Europeanised Media? European Integration and Political Communication,» in *Europeanised Politics? European Integration and National Political Systems*, ed. Klaus H. Goetz and Simon Hix (London, 2001), 132–135, Triandafyllidou, "Research Note: The Launch of the Euro in the Italian Media."

86   Hodess, „News Coverage of European Politics.", Meyer, „(De-)Constructing legitimacy in the European public sphere.", Semetko and Valkenburg, „Framing European politics: a content analysis of press and television news," (Amsterdam 1997).

87   Deirdre Kevin, „Coverage of the European Parliament elections of 1999. National public spheres and European debates," *Javnost. The Public* 8 (2002), Lauf and Peter, „EU-Repräsentationen in Fernsehnachrichten. Eine Analyse ihrer Präsenz in 13 EU-Mitgliedstaaten vor der Europawahl 1999.", Os and Jankowski, „An online European Public Sphere? The Web and Europeanization of Political Communication in the EU.", Stefan Reiser, *Parteienkampagne und Medienberichterstattung im Europa-Wahlkampf 1989. Eine Untersuchung zu Dependenz und Autonomieverlust im Verhältnis von Massenmedien und Politik* (Konstanz, 1994), Claes H. de Vreese et al., „The News Coverage of the 2004 European Parliamentary Election in 25 Countries," *European Union Politics* 7 (2006), Claes H. de Vreese et al., „How domestic are European Elections," in *A European Public Sphere. How much of it do we have and how much do we need?*, ed. Claes H. de Vreese and Hermann Schmitt (Mannheim, 2007).

88   Trenz, „European Dilemmas," 415.Cf. also: Jürgen Gerhards, „Das Öffentlichkeitsdefizit der EU im Horizont normativer Öffentlichkeitstheorien," in *Transnationale Öffentlichkeiten und Identitäten im 20. Jahrhundert*, ed. Hartmut Kaelble, Martin Kirsch, and Alexander Schmidt-Gernig (Frankfurt, New York, 2002), 145.

1989).[89] Only Jürgen Gerhards and Juan Díez Medrano analysed data for the entire post-war period (1951–1995 / 1946–1995). However, as they relied on very small samples or on data for just one country, their findings may only be treated as indicative.[90] Stefan Seidendorf compared debates on Europe in 1952 and 2000, but deliberately chose years of substantial attention on Europe, thus making it impossible to generalise from his evidence.[91] The EMEDIATE project, which applied a broader conceptual history approach towards the European public sphere,[92] compared eight crisis events from the 1956 "Hungarian revolution" to the debate on the "Mohammed cartoons" in February 2006.[93] This project was also the first to include Eastern Europe.[94] Both EMEDIATE and the project of Jens Lucht and David Tréfas, who presented the first findings of a time series analysis that attempted to cover the entire period between 1951 and 2005,[95] do not focus on the structure of European political communication, but on the content of the discourse, in particular the concept of Europe and European identity.

Differences in the underlying theoretical concepts of the European public sphere, in the definition, the operationalisation and measurement of European public communication have produced research results which do not lend themselves to drawing clear-cut conclusions.[96] This concerns particularly the *level* of coverage, which is crucially contingent on the operationalisation.[97] Only if studies

89   Hodess, „News Coverage of European Politics.", Bernhard Peters, „Die Transnationalisierung von Öffentlichkeit und ihre Bedeutung für politische Ordnungen am Beispiel der EU. Forschungsantrag für Sfb 597 Staatlichkeit im Wandel," (Bremen, 2002), 463f.

90   Díez Medrano, *Framing Europe*. 267f, Gerhards, „Das Öffentlichkeitsdefizit der EU im Horizont normativer Öffentlichkeitstheorien," 143, Gerhards, „Europäisierung von Ökonomie und Politik und die Trägheit der Entstehung einer europäischen Öffentlichkeit," 296.

91   Stefan Seidendorf, *Europäisierung nationaler Identitätsdiskurse? Ein Vergleich französischer und deutscher Printmedien* (Baden-Baden, 2007).

92   Bo Stråth and Ruth Wodak, „Europe-Discourse-Politics-Media-History: Constructing ‚Crises'," in *Europe in Crisis: The ‚European Public Sphere' and National Media in the Post-War Period*, ed. Anna Triandafyllidou, Ruth Wodak, and Michal Krzyzanowski (Basingstoke, 2009).

93   Anna Triandafyllidou, Ruth Wodak, and Michal Krzyzanowski, eds., *Europe in Crisis: The ‚European Public Sphere' and National Media in the Post-War Period* (Basingstoke, 2009).

94   Only recently Eastern Europe has been included: e.g. Kutter, „Petitioner or Partner? Constructions of European Integration in Polish Print Media Debates on the EU Constitutional Treaty.", Petra Rakušanová, The Constitutional Debate: A One Man Show? Václav Klaus and the Constitutional Discourse in the Czech Media (ConstEPS Working Paper No. 2006/2, University of Bremen, 2006), Aleksandra Wyrozumska, Who is Willing to die for the Constitution? The National Debate on the Constitutional Treaty in Poland (ConstEPS Working Paper No. 2006/4, University of Bremen, 2006).

95   Jens Lucht and David Tréfas, Hat Europa eine Identität? Eine zeitreihenbasierte Untersuchung der öffentlichen europäischen Kommunikation von 1951 bis 2005. (fög discussion paper DI-2006–0001, fög-Forschungsbereich Öffentlichkeit und Gesellschaft Zürich, 2006).

96   Neidhardt, „Europäische Öffentlichkeit als Prozess," 47–49.

97   E.g. Eilders and Voltmer find a similarly low level of commentary on EU affairs in German newspapers in the mid-1990s as Gerhards (around 5.6% vs. Gerhards' 6.9%). Sifft et al., who also analysed commentary, agree with these findings of a level of EU coverage of below 10%. Nevertheless, Kantner and Trenz who analysed the political news sections find substantially higher levels of European coverage in the year 2000 of on average 15.6% of the articles focusing on EU affairs. Christiane Eilders and Katrin Voltmer, "Zwischen Marginalisierung und Konsens. Europäische Öffentlichkeit in Deutschland," in *Die Stimme der Medien. Pressekommentare und politische Öffentlichkeit in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, ed. Christiane Eilders, Friedhelm Neidhardt, and Barbara Pfetsch (Wiesbaden, 2004), 372, Gerhards, „Europäisierung von Ökonomie und Politik und die Trägheit der Entstehung einer europäischen Öffentlichkeit," 295, Cath-

compare data over time – applying the same indicators – will it be possible to observe a *trend* or development.[98] I will address the five characteristics of the European public sphere in turn.

1.3.1 European polity as a point of reference

Did the European polity increasingly become a point of reference?
In 2000, Jürgen Gerhards became the first to address this question empirically. In a secondary analysis of data on German news coverage for the entire postwar period, he found that the share of European coverage actually declined until the end of the 1980s and only increased in the first half of the 1990s. Consequently he concluded that media attention devoted to European politics lagged behind the advance of European integration.[99] Similarly, Seidendorf observed that the debate on Europe was about as extensive in 1952 as in 2000.[100] While these results support Gerhards' finding that there was a high level of attention to Europe in the early 1950s, Seidendorf's observations are not exactly comparable because he specifically selected the year 1952 due to the vivid debate in France and Germany at that time.

Most of the studies available by 2008 suggest an increase in media attention on the EU as a point of reference since the 1980s. Sifft et al. noted a "robust and statistically significant trend towards Europeanization" in their analysis of "discursive articles" from *FAZ* (D), *Le Monde* (F), *The Times* (UK), *Die Presse* (AT) and *Politiken* (DK) between 1982 and 2003. The average share of articles focusing on European governance steadily grew from 2% in 1982 to 9.2% in 2003. The proportion of articles mentioning the EU increased from 8.3% in 1982 to 21.8% in 2003.[101] Similarly, Koopmans found that European integration had increasingly become a point of reference for political actors' "claims" in the media between 1990 and 2002.[102] A growing share of them addressed the EU. Various policy areas were increasingly discussed as policies of European scope. Additionally, the number of claims concerning European integration policy and polity making was higher in 2000–2003

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leen Kantner, „Die thematische Verschränkung nationaler Öffentlichkeiten in Europa und die Qualität transnationaler politischer Kommunikation,“ in *Demokratie in der Mediengesellschaft*, ed. Kurt Imhof, et al. (Wiesbaden, 2006), 153, Stefanie Sifft et al., „Segmented Europeanization: Exploring the Legitimacy of the European Union from a Public Discourse Perspective,“ *Journal of Common Market Studies* 45 (2007): 135, Trenz, *Europa in den Medien*. 197f.

98 Sifft et al., „Segmented Europeanization,“ 133.

99 Gerhards, „Europäisierung von Ökonomie und Politik und die Trägheit der Entstehung einer europäischen Öffentlichkeit,“ 295, 294 chart 3. He relies on data produced by: Hans Mathias Kepplinger, *Die Demontage der Politik in der Informationsgesellschaft* (Freiburg, 1998).

100 Seidendorf, *Europäisierung nationaler Identitätsdiskurse?* 372.

101 Sifft et al., „Segmented Europeanization,“ 135 (quote), 140 (table 2, numbers). „Discursive articles“ comprise comment and analysis pieces, external contributions, interviews.

102 Their unit of analysis are not the newspaper articles but „instances of claims making (shorthand: a claim) as a unit of strategic action in the public sphere“. Ruud Koopmans, Integrated Report. Cross-National, Cross-Issue, Cross-Time. Analysis of Political Claims in European Print Media (EUROPUB. The Transformation of Political Mobilisation and Communication in European Public Spheres, 2004), 13. On claims: Ruud Koopmans and Paul Statham, „Political Claims Analysis. Integrating Protest Event and Public Discourse Approaches,“ *Mobilization* 4 (1999).

than it had been in 1990/1995.[103] In her analysis of British and German media around four summits in 1985 and 1990/91, Robin Hodess found an increase in European coverage by 167% between the Single European Act (SEA) and the Maastricht negotiations.[104]

It is more problematic to draw conclusions about change over time from data based on the analysis of debates, because such data are strongly contingent on the content and the context of these debates. However, there is some evidence of growing attention to the EU. In her media analysis of three international crises, namely the Gulf War of 1991, the Kosovo War of 1999 and the 2003 Iraq War, Antje Knorr found an increasing share of references to debates at the EU level between the 1991 Gulf War and the 2003 Iraq War. During the 1999 Kosovo War, the level was substantially lower.[105] Similarly, on the basis of media coverage of all military and humanitarian interventions between 1990 and 2005, Kantner and Renfordt concluded that the "[i]ntensity with which the EC is perceived as an international actor [is] slightly increas[ing] in European countries".[106] All in all, there is substantial evidence that the EU has increasingly become a point of reference since the 1990s. Evidently, in the wake of Maastricht, transparency in relation to European affairs improved. Still, Sifft et al. essentially agree with Gerhards that public scrutiny has been lagging behind the growing political importance of the EU. The growth of EU coverage did not really keep pace with the increase in EU legislation, they found.[107] Information about the development of EC coverage for the 1980s is more limited, while for the decades before that, systematic analyses are entirely lacking.

1.3.2 Synchronicity

Were the same issues increasingly discussed at the same time at the same level of relevance?
There is ample evidence that the same (European) issues have frequently been discussed at the same time at roughly the same level of relevance, i.e. receiving a similar level of media coverage. Issue attention cycles frequently ran parallel to each other, such as in the debate on the European constitution, in the debate on enlargement, but even as early as the debate on the ECSC and the Sarre question in 1952.[108] Moreover, in her analysis of European Councils in 1985 and 1990/91,

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103 Koopmans, Integrated Report. Cross-National, Cross-Issue, Cross-Time, 40f, tables 11, 15, 13.

104 Robin B. Hodess, „Media Coverage of European Community Politics in Britain and Germany 1985–1991" (PhD, University of Cambridge, 1997). 126. She erroneously speaks of an increase by 267%.

105 Knorr, Europäische Öffentlichkeit und transnationale Kommunikation im sicherheitspolitischen Bereich, 222.

106 Kantner and Renfordt, „Public Debates on Humanitarian and Military Interventions in Europe and the U.S. (1990–2005)", 21f.

107 Sifft et al., „Segmented Europeanization," 137f. For their assessment of the impact of the EU in legislation, they relied on problematic quantitative indicators.

108 Seidendorf, *Europäisierung nationaler Identitätsdiskurse?* 160–162 (Sarre, ECSC), 265 (Haider), Marianne van de Steeg, „Eine europäische Öffentlichkeit? Die Diskussion um die Osterweiterung der EU," *Berliner Debatte Initial* 13 (2002): 62f. (enlargement), Vetters, „Konvent + Verfassung = Öffentlichkeit.". 158 (constitution).

Hodess found that the British and German media covered the specific themes with similar levels of frequency.[109] Generally, events that were considered relevant throughout Europe apparently received similar amounts of attention. Synchronous coverage could also be found in debates on biotechnology[110] and on international crises. The synchronous coverage of international crises – at the same level of relevance – was not limited to Europe, but frequently included the US, too. This suggests that the European debate on these issues was indeed part of a broader international public sphere.[111]

The importance of national differences with regard to the level of attention remained contentious. In his Franco-German comparison of Europe as front page news in the quality newspapers, Nicolas Hubé found that the German newspapers were more likely to place EU affairs as the lead story on the front page than their French counterparts.[112] Similarly, Seifert stressed national differences concerning the presence of "national ensembles of mass-media, actors and symbolic codes".[113] Conversely, Steeg and Risse placed greater emphasis on qualitative indicators such as "meaning structures" in their analyses of the debates on enlargement and the Haider affair. They highlighted the shared frame of reference, an insider's perspective on common European problems. This, they argued, was what marked the specific difference between EU and non-EU media.[114]

There are some indications of convergence. In their analysis of actors' claims in the media, Koopmans found that between 1990 and 2002 actors across the European countries increasingly agreed on whether an issue was relevant to the European level or not.[115] Hodess observed that by 1990/91 the British media's level of EC coverage had become closer to that of the German media.[116] Seifert demonstrated the emergence of a synchronous European debate on biotechnology from 1996/97 onwards, whereas earlier debates on biotechnology had been limited to individual countries. He attributes this development both to the growth of European competences, but also to international media events such as the first cloned sheep "Dolly".[117]

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109 Hodess, „News Coverage of European Politics. A Comparison of Change in Britain and Germany," 456–458.

110 Seifert, Synchronised National Publics as Functional Equivalent of an Integrated European Public, 9–11, Appendix.

111 Kantner and Renfordt, „Public Debates on Humanitarian and Military Interventions in Europe and the U.S. (1990–2005)", 14.

112 Nicolas Hubé, „L'Union Européenne à la „Une": Un cadrage difficile d'une actualité peu visible. Regard comparé sur la presse française et allemande," in *L'Union européenne et les médias. Regards croisés sur l'information européenne*, ed. Guillaume Garcia and Virginie Le Torrec, Cahiers politiques (Paris, 2003), 73f, 76.

113 Seifert, Synchronised National Publics as Functional Equivalent of an Integrated European Public, 11.

114 Marianne van de Steeg and Thomas Risse, The Emergence of a European Community of Communication: Insights from Empirical Research on the Europeanization of Public Spheres (Center for Transnational Relations, Foreign and Security Policy, Free University Berlin, 14 May 2007), 11–13.

115 Koopmans, Integrated Report. Cross-National, Cross-Issue, Cross-Time, own calculations based on table 13, 41.

116 Hodess, „News Coverage of European Politics," 456–458.

117 Seifert, Synchronised National Publics as Functional Equivalent of an Integrated European Public, 9–11.

In the analysis of debates on international politics, which were arguably part of a wider international, rather than a more narrowly circumscribed European public sphere, Kantner found there to be international convergence including the US in the early 2000s. Synchronous coverage clearly varied with the perceived political relevance of the issues in the different countries. Knorr's and Kantner's analyses of debates on international conflict found there to be convergence between the continental countries Germany and France on the one hand, and the United Kingdom and the United States on the other – in quantitative terms (Kantner) and with regard to the patterns of interpretation in relation to the Iraq war (Knorr). In a situation when a political rift cut across Europe between those in support and those in opposition to US policy, this result was not surprising.[118]

All in all, there is evidence that the criterion of synchronous coverage has frequently been met. However, information relating to the 1970s and 1980s is lacking. There has been tentative evidence of convergence in recent years. Not least due to varying operationalisations, researchers arrived at different results with respect to the magnitude of national differences in media coverage. The Eder-Kantner criterion of the public sphere has also been applied to the analysis of the coverage of international politics. Evidence of synchronous coverage beyond Europe, or cutting across Europe, suggests that debates vary in geographical scope according to the perceived relevance for the respective country. Consequently, it is very much to be expected that the coverage of European politics will be similar and synchronous across EC countries that are affected by EC decisions. Synchronous coverage seems an important, however not a sufficient indicator for the analysis of a public sphere. If the European public sphere is not only defined by the coverage of European affairs, but is also conceived as a structure of transnational communication across national boundaries in Europe, will be is necessary to take transnational communication will into account.

1.3.3 Mediators' transnational involvement

Did the structure of mediators change in a way that suggests increased transnational communication and broader participation?
There is very little information on the historical development of European journalism.[119] Most studies focus on the present. The Brussels correspondents have been the most important transnational mediators of European politics, acting as the main brokers of EU-related information at the central exchange in Brussels. The number of EC/EU correspondents increased with the successive waves of enlargement from about 150 in the late 1960s to 480 by 1987. While numbers remained almost stable until the 1991, with 520 correspondents, the 1990s saw a boom of Brussels journalism.

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118 Kantner and Renfordt, „Public Debates on Humanitarian and Military Interventions in Europe and the U.S. (1990–2005)", 14, 17, Knorr, Europäische Öffentlichkeit und transnationale Kommunikation im sicherheitspolitischen Bereich, 220.

119 A recent publication emerging from the EMEDIATE project addresses this lacuna: Paschal Preston, *Making the News. Journalism and News Cultures in Europe* (London, 2008).

Table 1: Development of the number of accredited journalists in Brussels 1955–2003[120]

Year	1955	1965–73	1976	1987	1991	1995	1999	2003
Number	23	ca. 150	259	480	520	703	813	873

In the early days of European integration, news agencies were the main employers of Brussels correspondents. It is only since the late 1960s that newspapers have increasingly had their own correspondents in Brussels, such as Philippe Lemaitre, who has reported for *Le Monde* since 1966.[121] However, more specific information in respect of Brussels journalism in the 1970s and 1980s is not available. Christoph Meyer's study of Brussels journalism in the 1990s demonstrates changes in the structure of the group of Brussels correspondents and concomitant alterations in their self-understanding, professional norms and transnational cooperation. With the growing influx of Northern European journalists, particularly after the Northern enlargement of 1995, and the overall growth and rejuvenation of the press corps, professional norms in Brussels journalism changed: from a self-perception as "fake Eurocrats without the wages" to the ideal of the critical "watchdog". For the first time transnational cooperation in investigative journalism was so effective that it brought down the Santer Commission in 1999.[122] European correspondents' attitudes and their transnational cooperation before the 1990s have so far remained unexplored. Hodess noted that between 1985 and 1990/91 the number of European correspondents of British and German newspaper and public service television increased. In the German media in particular, a wider group of journalists got involved in the coverage of European affairs. Whether this development ultimately led to a different treatment of European news, remains to be explored.

1.3.4 Transnational communication

Is there indication of growing transnational communication and a diversifying range of actors?
Evidence of change in the extent of transnational communication is ambiguous. For the postwar period, the EMEDIATE project and Stefan Seidendorf's analysis of European debates in 1952 showed that there has long been mutual awareness of the European policy of the European neighbours. German and French newspapers observed their neighbours' parliamentary debates on the EDC and the Sarre issue

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120 Olivier Baisnée, „La production de l'actualité communautaire. Eléments d'une sociologie du corps de presse accrédité auprès de l'Union européenne (France / Grande Bretagne)" (PhD thesis, Institut d'études politiques de Rennes, 2003). 112, 115, European Commission, „Annuaire des journalistes accrédités auprès des Institutions européennes (unpublished)," (Brussels, 2003), own count, JHM, Yann de l' Ecotais, *Naissance d'une nation* (Paris, 1990). 123f, Meyer, *Europäische Öffentlichkeit als Kontrollsphäre*. 122f.

121 Baisnée, „La production de l'actualité communautaire.". 107f, 113.

122 Christoph O. Meyer, „Die Wächterfunktion von europäischer Öffentlichkeit. Das Brüsseler Pressecorps und der Rücktritt der EU-Kommission," in *Bürgerschaft, Öffentlichkeit und Demokratie in Europa*, ed. Ansgar Klein, et al. (Opladen, 2003), 236–38, Meyer, *Europäische Öffentlichkeit als Kontrollsphäre*. 121–149, quote 122.

as early as 1952.[123] In the debate around the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961, communication and debate crossed the Iron Curtain. East European media and actors were frequently quoted in Western media and vice-versa. Transnational communication in Europe was not limited to European integration, but even persisted amid the situation of mutual hostility during the Cold War. Nevertheless, the specific differences between modes of transnational communication in both contexts require further exploration. Schulz-Forberg noted that Daniel Cohn-Bendit's expulsion from France in 1968 triggered a transnational debate in which actors and media referred to each other across national borders in Western Europe.[124]

Whether transnational exchange has become more intense with the advance of European integration is contentious among researchers. Information on the period before the 1990s is virtually absent. Gerhards noted that the share of references to actors from European institutions in German newspapers increased slightly in the early 1990s.[125] However, both Sifft et al. and Koopmans found essentially stable shares of references to actors from other European countries as participants in the debate between 1982/1990 and 2002/03.[126] Only Scherer's and Vesper's study of references to newspapers from other countries quoted in German newspapers between 1994 and 2000 observed growing transnational exchange across national borders.[127] Not only did the quantity of references grow, but the range of issues also diversified. Increasingly, not only views from large and neighbouring France,

123 Stefan Seidendorf, „Europäisierung nationaler Identitätsdiskurse?". 139.

124 Hagen Schulz-Forberg, „Berlin Wall Crisis. Global Cold War and the Role of Europe," in *Europe in Crisis: The 'European Public Sphere' and National Media in the Post-War Period*, ed. Anna Triandafyllidou, Ruth Wodak, and Michal Krzyzanowski (Basingstoke, 2009), Hagen Schulz-Forberg, "Paris in May 1968. Social Conflict, Democracy, and the Role of Europe," in *Europe in Crisis: The 'European Public Sphere' and National Media in the Post-War Period*, ed. Anna Triandafyllidou, Ruth Wodak, and Michal Krzyzanowski (Basingstoke, 2009).

125 Gerhards, „Europäisierung von Ökonomie und Politik und die Trägheit der Entstehung einer europäischen Öffentlichkeit," 296.

126 Sifft et al., „Segmented Europeanization," 142f.: Share of discursive references to other Europeans: 1982: 19%, 1989: 18%, 1996: 20%, 2003: 14%; Koopmans, Integrated Report. Cross-National, Cross-Issue, Cross-Time, 22, 39f.:"slight increase" of actors from other European countries in debate on European integration: 1990: 27%, 1995: 33%, 2000: 31%, 2002: 29% (22, 39, table 8); Presence of actors from other European countries in newspapers from EU countries (incl. CH): 1990: 16% (18%), 1995: 18% (19%), 2000: 14% (16%), 2002: 17% (15%) (40, table 10); Presence of addressees from other European countries in EU newspapers (incl. CH): 1990: 13% (14%), 1995: 16% (18%), 2000: 14% (16%), 2002: 13% (14%) (40, table 12)

127 While Scherer and Vesper consider both press reviews and quotes and references within the text, numerous studies have considered press reviews as the most obvious newspaper section for transnational communication. However, only Scherer and Vesper take a longer term perspective. Cf. Jessica Erbe, "Integration der politischen Öffentlichkeit in Europa durch Vernetzung. Der Fall der grenzüberschreitenden Presseschauen in Deutschland," in *Europäische Öffentlichkeit und medialer Wandel: Eine transdisziplinäre Perspektive*, ed. Wolfgang R. Langenbucher and Michael Latzer (Wiesbaden, 2006), Christian Le Bart, „L'invention du lecteur européen. La revue de presse d'Alex Taylor sur France-Inter," in *En quête d'Europe: médias européens et médiatisation de l'Europe*, ed. Dominique Marchetti (Rennes, 2004), Helmut Scherer and Simone Vesper, «Was schreiben die anderen? Ausländische Pressestimmen als Vorform paneuropäischer Öffentlichkeit – Eine Inhaltsanalyse deutscher Qualitätszeitungen,» in *Europäische Union und mediale Öffentlichkeit. Theoretische Befunde und Perspektiven zur Rolle der Medien im europäischen Einigungsprozess*, ed. Lutz Hagen (Köln, 2004).

but also from a variety of countries that shared the Euro currency were included.[128] Andreas Wimmel found a substantial amount of transnational discursive references in the debate on Turkish EU membership since the late 1990s. However, this debate, which had become more intensely transnational between 1999 and 2002, retreated back into a largely national mode in 2004.[129] Evidently, the quantity and the scope of transnational references were contingent on the issue and on the phase of the debate. Consequently, with regard to the Haider debate, Steeg and Risse argued that it was not so much the quantity of transnational references which indicated that public communication was actually of European scope, but the conspicuous absence of references to non-Europeans.[130]

Journalists tend to "domesticate" European affairs by linking them to the views and actions of domestic actors.[131] The degree of domestication and transnational openness differed along national lines. British newspapers were found to be the most domestically oriented ones. Pfetsch et al. noted that 72% of the claims by commentators addressed the national government in British newspapers – as against 51% in German newspapers and 42% in the French ones. In the same way, the EU and other European countries featured substantially less prominently in the British newspapers. With respect to the presence of societal actors such as civil society organisations, there were hardly any national differences between newspapers. In the 1990s and early 2000s, the share of references to societal actors hardly changed.[132] Hodess, however, notes a decline in attention to governments and a growing presence of experts, interest groups and other civil society organisations in German and British newspapers between the European Councils of 1985 and 1990/91.[133]

Whether the European partners' views have actually been discussed more frequently, remains unclear. The larger and more comprehensive studies suggest that there was little change. Newspapers from different European countries differed in their openness to views from other European countries. Again, information here is essentially limited to the 1990s and early 2000s. If transnational communication hardly increased, what happened with regard to shifts in identification? Various researchers have assumed that increased transnational communication should lead to the emergence of a European sense of community.[134]

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128 Scherer and Vesper, „Was schreiben die anderen?,“ 201f., 206f.
129 Andreas Wimmel, „Transnationale Diskurse in der europäischen Medienöffentlichkeit,“ *Politische Vierteljahresschrift* 46 (2005).: 278f
130 Steeg and Risse, The Emergence of a European Community of Communication, 17.
131 Eilders and Voltmer, „Zwischen Marginalisierung und Konsens,“ 372.
132 Barbara Pfetsch et al., The Voice of the Media in European Public Sphere: Comparative Analysis of Newspaper Editorials. Integrated Report (EUROPUB. The Transformation of Political Mobilisation and Communication in European Public Spheres, 15 July 2004), 20f, table 10, 11.
133 Hodess, „News Coverage of European Politics,“ 464.
134 E.g. Kaelble, Kirsch, and Schmidt-Gernig, „Zur Entwicklung transnationaler Öffentlichkeiten und Identitäten im 20. Jahrhundert. Eine Einleitung,“ 10.

1.3.5 European self-understanding

Is there evidence of a common conceptualisation of the European political space? Has
there been growing European identification, a European sense of community?
With regard to a nascent European sense of community, empirical findings have so
far been ambiguous. Journalists' use of "we-references" has frequently been ana-
lysed in order to examine their identification with political communities, such as
the nation or the "West", for example. Sifft et al. found an increase of European
we-references from 1% in 1982 to 6% in 2003. However, the margin of fluctuation
was so wide that they could not elicit a clear trend.[135] In their analysis of various
European events between 1951 and 2005, Lucht and Tréan noted that in the con-
text of the foundation of the EEC in the mid-1950s, European we-references had
been more frequent, accounting for 7% of the total. In the following decades, Euro-
pean we-references normally only accounted for less than five per cent, this figure
increasing drastically to 28 per cent in the context of the debate on the European
constitution in the early 2000s. Nevertheless, the share of national we-references
has always been larger than that of the European ones.[136] In their analysis of the
Haider and enlargement debates Steeg and Risse observed a similar predominance
of national we-references. However, they were aware of the limitations of this in-
dicator:[137] Since the usage of "we" in the newspapers is very much contingent on
language and style, it is a problematic indicator in comparative research. Conse-
quently, I shall not be using this in the present study.

Research on European identity has demonstrated that the term 'Europe' has
evoked numerous associations: Europe has been conceived as a community of law,
as a community of peace and prosperity, as a counter-concept to the US, as a com-
munity of shared responsibility, or as a departure from the past. Steeg and Risse
argued that a European sense of community was discursively constructed in con-
troversial debates about normative ideals in which visions of Europe played a role.
They found that at the core of the Haider debate there was the shared invocation
of Europe as a community of law. In the debate on Eastern enlargement, however,
various narratives and interpretations of the history of Europe played a role. Fur-
thermore, Europe was associated with "peace, security, prosperity and unity".[138]
In the debate on the Iraq war of 2003, Knorr observed that French and German
media constructed an image of Europe based on respect for international law in
opposition to the US in the debate on the Iraq war. In the face of British support for
US intervention, British newspapers did not share such constructions. Similarly,
Seifert found mobilisation against US industry in the debate on GM food.[139]
Kryzanowski and Wodak interpreted the construction of shared European respon-
sibility in the debate on the Mohammad caricatures as a novel phenomenon.[140]
According to Seidendorf, the reinterpretation of Europe's history in the postwar

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135   Peters et al., „National and transnational public spheres," 149.
136   Lucht and Tréfas, Hat Europa eine Identität?, 22.
137   Steeg and Risse, The Emergence of a European Community of Communication, 17.
138   Ibid., 20–22.
139   Knorr, Europäische Öffentlichkeit und transnationale Kommunikation im sicherheitspolitischen
        Bereich, 230f, Seifert, Synchronised National Publics as Functional Equivalent of an Integrated
        European Public. 8. Seifert only mentions this in passing, while stressing the dominance of na-
        tional and local identifications.
140   Michal Krzyzanowski and Ruth Wodak, Case Studies of Media Discourse. Introductory Note

period had already begun in the 1950s in Germany. The new Europe was to be built in opposition to Europe's past of war and fascism as Europe's "other".[141] Such conceptualisations spread throughout Europe during the postwar period. Similarly, commentators in the European quality newspapers in 2000 engaged in the construction of what Hans-Jörg Trenz described as "progressive European-ism". They encouraged European identification by associating Europe with progress and the departure from its nationalist past.[142] Díez Medrano singled out the common basis of a European imagined community throughout Spain, Germany and the UK that was stable over time. This related to the benefits of the large European market, but also to the downsides of EU integration such as bureaucracy and democratic unaccountability.

At the same time, Díez Medrano stressed the different associations Europe evoked in different national contexts: fears about sovereignty in the UK, hopes for modernisation and overcoming isolation in Spain and qualms about the democratic deficit and fears concerning the Labour market in Germany.[143] More fundamentally, some researchers rejected the expectation of growing European identification. Instead they stressed the persistence and preponderance of national identifications and framings of Europe. For instance, Seifert argued that the issue of healthy food elicited sub-national, regional and local, rather than European identification. Europeans were apparently not aware of their shared rejection of GM food.[144] Reporting the results of the EMEDIATE project, Krzyzanowski and Wodak highlighted the fact that instances of European crises in the postwar period were strictly perceived in national terms. European crises had not in fact led to the invocation of European values and the association of Europe with certain values.[145] However, two questions remained unexplored: First, to what extent did conceptualisations change? Secondly, which conditions account for shared or differing concepts and identifications?

In sum, this review of the state of empirical research demonstrates that it is very difficult to draw clean-cut conclusions from a variety of studies that operationalise similar research questions in very different ways. Furthermore, research covering the European public sphere from a longer-term perspective is almost entirely absent. Most research results refer to the 1990s and 2000s. During this period, the EU increasingly became a point of reference. Essentially, the same issues were discussed at the same time at the same level of relevance. This was increasingly the case, even though in various respects national differences persisted. The number of European correspondents grew. Transnational communication, meas-

and Comparative Findings (EMEDIATE: Media and Ethics of a European Public Sphere from the Treaty of Rome to the 'War on Terror', 2006), 36.

141 Stefan Seidendorf, „Verständigung gegen die Vergangenheit? – Europäisierung von Erinnerung in Frankreich und Deutschland," in *Reichweiten der Verständigung. Intellektuellendiskurse zwischen Nation und Europa*, ed. Matthias Schöning and Stefan Seidendorf (Heidelberg, 2006), 267, 270f.

142 Trenz, *Europa in den Medien*. 360–373.

143 Díez Medrano, *Framing Europe*. 249.

144 Seifert, Synchronised National Publics as Functional Equivalent of an Integrated European Public, 16.

145 Michal Krzyzanowski, Anna Triandafyllidou, and Ruth Wodak, „Conclusions: Europe, Media, Crisis, and the European Public Sphere," in *Europe in Crisis: The 'European Public Sphere' and National Media in the Post-War Period*, ed. Anna Triandafyllidou, Ruth Wodak, and Michal Krzyzanowski (Basingstoke, 2009), Krzyzanowski and Wodak, Case Studies of Media Discourse, 37.

ured in terms of the debate of opinions from abroad, remained essentially stable. However, in some countries, e.g. in Britain, newspapers were more domestically oriented than in others. In the discourse on European integration, various conceptions of Europe were discursively constructed. While some of them were shared, nationally different conceptions continued to persist. To what extent these concepts implied a European identification, requires further research. In many cases, the evidence concerning the five aspects of the European public sphere is ambivalent or sketchy. Due to the absence of a longer-term perspective it is impossible to draw conclusions with regard to the development of European public communication. In an attempt to address this lacuna, this study will undertake a systematic historical comparison in order to generate reliable time series data for the first time, which will enable conclusions to be drawn in respect of the much-debated emergence of a European public sphere. The remaining part of the introduction will explain the selection of cases and sources.

1.4 Cases in time and space

Inquiring into the history of European public communication, this study is comparative in two senses: a temporal dimension – considering change over time – and a spatial dimension – involving comparisons between European countries. When choosing cases, two criteria have to be weighed. First, only a limited number of cases can be selected, in order to *reduce the amount of data* and keep the project manageable.[146] Secondly, the cases selected have to be *comparable*. The goal of case selection is to hold constant as many variables as possible, in order that variation can largely be attributed to change over time or differences between countries or media.[147]

1.4.1 Time

Two reasons informed the choice of the time period. First, by selecting the period that immediately precedes the well-researched post-Maastricht era, it will be possible to extend the temporal horizon of current research and allow for a longer-term assessment of continuity and change. Secondly, by covering the two decades between 1969 and 1991 this study focuses on two decades which differ substantially with regard to the intensity, the pace and the modes of European integration. So far the period between 1969 and 1985 has largely been dismissed as Europe's "dark ages". Only the recent debate on "Europe's second generation" has called for a reassessment of this time.[148] By contrast, the period from 1985 until 1991 has been celebrated as the period of European relaunch. Driven by Commission activism and converging member state interest, European integration made an unprecedented leap with the completion of the the Single Market and the move towards

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146 Jürgen Kocka, „Comparison and Beyond," *History and Theory* 42 (2003): 41.

147 Markus Haverland, „Does the EU cause domestic developments? Improving case selection in Europeanisation research," *West European Politics* 29 (2006): 139, Arendt Lijphardt, "Comparative Politics and Comparative Method," *American Political Science Review* 65 (1971): 687.

148 Knipping, *Rom, 25. März 1957: die Einigung Europas*. 156.

the European Union. Juxtaposing these two periods allows for an analysis of the relationship between European integration and the European public sphere. In other words, did more rapid European integration bring about a growth in and a diversification of European public communication?

My research design takes an event-based approach. As the newspaper sources for this period are not accessible in electronic format, but only as microfilms, it is impossible to carry out electronic sampling for a debate on a certain topic. An event-based study enables a certain number of issues around a certain date to be covered. A continuous, comprehensive sample of a number of consecutive days can be analysed in a variety of ways. First, patterns of European coverage developing around the event can be singled out. Since newspapers might not have covered the same issues on exactly the same day, this ensures completeness. Moreover, selecting specific events facilitates the historical contextualisation. Finally, since the average level of routine European public communication has long been low,[149] I selected some of the most prominent events in European politics, events which are likely to have been focal point of "crisis communication" and to mark the peaks of media attention during the respective time period.

European summits of the heads of state and government have taken place more regularly since 1969. They were institutionalised as the European Council at the summit of Paris 1974. As important recurring events, they lend themselves to comparison across time. Summits make particularly suitable cases for study: From the Summit of The Hague in 1969 onwards, European integration in the 1970s was characterised by intergovernmental initiative at European summits. Key decisions were made at meetings at the highest political level. Until the present, EU summits have been the most visible events of the politics of European integration.[150]

Five summits have been selected for their political relevance.[151] At the summits selected, some of the most important and most consequential political decisions of European Community politics were finalised. From a normative perspective, this is a valid choice, as important European decisions should have been discussed in the public sphere. In order to cover the entire period, the events should be evenly spread throughout the two decades. The *1969* summit of *The Hague*, which opened the door for British membership, marks the beginning of the period studied. The new French president Georges Pompidou set targets "*achèvement*", "*approfondissement*" and "*élargissement*", which have determined the trajectory of European integration until the present.[152] Among the summits of the mid-1970s, the *Paris* summit of *1974* produced the most tangible results: The Regional Development Fund was set up, and a number of institutional innovations were introduced, such as the European Council and the agreement on direct elections to the European Parliament. In the latter half of the 1970s, the *Brussels* European Council

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149 Gerhards, „Europäisierung von Ökonomie und Politik und die Trägheit der Entstehung einer europäischen Öffentlichkeit," 293–295.

150 Alternatively, European elections could have been considered. However, as the first direct elections only took place in June 1979, it would not have been possible to cover the entire time period.

151 For the selection, I have relied on the historiography of the European integration and the European Council. Clearly, the historical and political relevance that appears in retrospect does not necessarily coincide with contemporary perception.

152 This was highlighted by Sir Ralph Dahrendorf at the „Konstanzer Meisterklasse", directed by Bernhard Giesen, September 2002.

of *1978* marks the most important policy innovation during this period, namely introduction of the European Monetary System (EMS). The European Council in *Luxembourg 1985* decided upon the Single European Act (SEA), the first treaty revision in the history of the EC, which kicked off the Single Market Programme. At *Maastricht* in *1991*, the Treaty on European Union (TEU) drastically widened the scope of EC policy-making, notably including Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and European Monetary Union (EMU).

These summits are also comparable in a formal sense: They all took place on a Monday and Tuesday in early December, thus occurring at the same moment in the weekly and the annual news cycle. I chose to study a period of two weeks around the summit, namely the entire week before the event and the remainder of the week after. I thus covered the preparatory work in the run-up to the summit and the reactions to the meeting, including e.g. the governments' presentation of the summit results to the national parliaments.[153] The following table gives an overview of the place and dates of the summits, the main decisions taken, and the period of study.

1.4.2 Space

As indicated above, the space that the political European public sphere refers to is that of the European Community. In this study, European integration is limited to the process of EC integration that started with the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951. This Europe of the Six signed the Rome Treaty in 1957 comprised the European Economic Community (EEC), EURATOM and the original ECSC. By many standards, this was the most dynamic and successful attempt at European integration, EC integration having created a multi-level polity, surpassing mere intergovernmental cooperation.[154] Limiting this study to the EC excludes other European institutions such as the Council of Europe, which deals mainly with human rights, or defence institutions such as NATO and the WEU.[155] It also ignores alternative European institutions such as COMECON during the Cold War, intended to strengthen economic exchange in Communist Eastern Europe, or EFTA, the free trade agreement Britain encouraged as a response to the founding of the EC.[156] Most of their members eventually joined the EU in various waves of enlargement. In the period between 1969 and 1991 the geographical

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153 In preliminary research of a longer period of time I found that nearly the entire coverage relating to the summit was limited to the two-weeks period.

154 Cf. Simon Hix, *The political system of the European Union. Second edition* (New York, 2005).

155 WEU has been integrated into the EU framework only by the Maastricht Treaty: „The union requests the Western European Union (WEU), which is an integral part of the development of the Union, to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications." (Treaty on European Union (TEU), title 5, article J4, 2). For WEU's history see: Anne Deighton, ed., *Western European Union 1954–1997: defence, security, integration* (Oxford, 1997).

156 Wolfram Kaiser, „Culturally Embedded and Path-Dependent: Peripheral Alternatives to ECSC/EEC „core Europe" since 1945," *Journal of European Integration History,* 7 (2001): 14f, Wolfram Kaiser, "The Successes and Limits of Industrial Market Integration: The European Free Trade Association 1963–1969," in *Crises and Compromises: The European Project 1963–1969*, ed. Wilfried Loth (Baden-Baden, 2001).

scope of the EC changed three times: First in 1973 with the accession of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom, then in 1981, with the inclusion of Greece, and again in 1986 with the so-called Iberian enlargement to Spain and Portugal.

In an ideal world, a study of the European public sphere should comprise European public communication in all member states. However, not even collaborative projects have been able to cover the EU in its entirety. Limiting this study to three countries, I will not be able to draw conclusions in respect of the whole of European public communication. Only including large countries, while ignoring smaller ones, may lead to a systematic distortion. However, choosing three countries of similar size and political importance will improve the conditions for comparison, and will allow this comparison to be situated solidly in its historical context.[157]

Table 2: Important European summit conferences 1969–1991

Place – Year – Presidency	Main results	Date	Period of study
The Hague 1969, NL	F accepts UK membership, agreement on „own resources", completion, deepening, enlargement	Mon. 1/12 and Tue. 2/12/1969	Mon. 24/11/ – Sat. 6/12/1969
Paris 1974, F	Introduction of European Councils, direct EP elections, regional fund, Tindemans-Report commissioned	Mon. 9/12 and Tue. 10/12/1974	Mon. 2/12/ – Sat. 14/12/1974
Brussels 1978, D	Decision to introduce European Monetary System, commission for the preparation of the institutions for enlargement	Mon. 4/12 and Tue. 5/12/1978	Mon. 27/11/ – Sat. 9/12/1978
Luxembourg 1985, LU	Agreement on Single European Act – achievement of the Single Market by 1992	Mon. 2/12 until Wed. 4/12/1985	Mon. 25/11/ – Sat. 7/12/1985
Maastricht 1991, NL	Agreement on Maastricht treaty: Economic and Monetary Union, European Union.	Mon. 9/12 and Tue. 10/12/1991	Mon. 2/12/ – Sat. 14/12/1991

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157 Heinz-Gerhard Haupt, „European history as comparative history," *Ab Imperio* 5 (2004): 116.

The United Kingdom, France and (West) Germany[158] are comparable cases, because they are similar in many respects.[159] They are the most populous West European countries with roughly similar populations of around 60 million (until German reunification) and comprise the largest economies. Between themselves, they accounted for the majority of the population in the Community of the Twelve. Accordingly they represented a large part of the audience in the European public sphere. These three countries are also the most powerful and politically most visible member states. At the same time, their historical experiences, particularly in the postwar period, were very different and led to diverging expectations of European integration. Hence, political attitudes towards European integration continue differ. This accounts for interesting variations in the comparison. Even though the UK only joined the EC in 1973, I have covered Britain from 1969, when the decision to eventually accept Britain as a member was taken in The Hague,[160] an event that was closely observed by the British public.

1.5 Sources

My study is limited to the public sphere of the media, because in modern mass societies this is where politics are debated and where people learn about European integration.[161] Due to the marginal role played by transnational European media,[162] I will rely on national media. Despite occasional criticism that public sphere research has focused too much on national quality newspapers,[163] they remain the central arena for information and critique not only of national but also of international and European politics. Quality newspapers mainly write for an elite audience of the well-educated and affluent strata of society. Even so, broadsheets have a pivotal role as opinion leaders in national media systems. Their agenda-setting, their coverage and commentary are closely observed by fellow journalists. Hence they can be considered opinion leaders. Assuming that European integration was covered only superficially during the pre-Maastricht period, quality newspapers have been chosen as the "most likely case" for observing European public communication.[164]

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158 In the following, for reasons of readability and convenience, I will frequently use the term Germany also for West Germany before re-unification in 1990. As the German Democratic Republic was not a relevant player in West European integration, this will not lead to ambiguities. Likewise, I will use United Kingdom (UK) and (Great) Britain interchangeably, even though the first term is a political one, while the second one is a geographical term that does not include Northern Ireland – which is part of the UK.

159 Haverland, „Does the EU cause domestic developments?" 139.

160 Knipping, *Rom, 25. März 1957*. 152–155.

161 Cf. European Commission, Public opinion in the European Union. Eurobarometer Spring 2004. EB 61. (Eurobarometer, 2004).

162 Cf. Vetters, „Konvent + Verfassung = Öffentlichkeit.". 66–73.

163 Trenz, „European Dilemmas." 410.

164 Cf. Barbara Pfetsch, „Media Opinion in European Public Debate. An Empirical Study of Newspaper Editorials in seven Countries" (paper presented at the Annual Conference of the ICA, 26–30 May 2005, New York, 2005), Sifft et al., „Segmented Europeanization," 134.

In line with the practice in other comparative media studies I selected two newspapers per country,[165] in order to roughly account for political divisions within national national public spheres. For France I selected *Le Monde* (LM)[166] and *Le Figaro* (LF), for the UK the *Guardian* (GU) and the *Daily Telegraph* (DT),[167] and for Germany the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (SZ) and the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (FAZ).[168] Whereas *Le Monde*, the *Guardian* and the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* tend to be left of centre, *Le Figaro*, the *Daily Telegraph* and the *FAZ* represent the conservative views in the respective countries.[169] Some studies additionally include a newspaper from the USA as an external benchmark. The external comparison enables them to elicit more clearly what European media have in common and what distinguishes European public communication. Methodologically, this is good practice.[170] However, in my study, I did not include such an external comparison for three reasons: First, Marianne van de Steeg has demonstrated that the debate on EU issues in the non-EU media significantly differs from the one in EU media.[171] Second, it is difficult to find an an appropriate external benchmark.[172] The US are distant, large and barely affected by EU decisions. Thus it can be expected that the amount and the mode of coverage of EU news strongly diverge. The role of Swiss media, particularly the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, with its large international coverage and its large audience outside Switzerland, is more ambiguous. Switzerland is politically outside the EU, but it has been connected to the EU and, earlier, to the EC by a great number of political, economic and geographical ties. These links call into question the rigid juxtaposition between inside and outside. Finally and most importantly, as I understand European public sphere as an arena of communication with a view to the European polity, the European public sphere is limited to the EC by definition. Consequently, an external comparison would only be indispensable when trying to "prove" the existence of the European public sphere as an

165 Marianne van de Steeg found significant quantitative differences e.g. between SZ and FAZ in her analysis of enlargement. Hence, it is problematic to solely rely on one newspaper per country. Steeg, "The public sphere in the European Union.". 146.

166 *Le Monde* does not appear on Mondays, but the Sunday issue features as a Sunday-Monday issue. Therefore I count it as the Monday paper.

167 *The Daily Telegraph* was chosen instead of the traditionally more renowned Times, because the Times did not appear from Dec. 1 1978, for more than one year, due to an industrial dispute. Given that the Brussels summit took place in Dec. 1978, the sample would have been incomplete. The archives replace the Times with *The Daily Telegraph* which might be interpreted as interchangeable. *The Daily Telegraph* – nicknamed "Torygraph" stands for more pronounced conservative views, however, it was used to represent the British quality press along with *The Guardian* also by Hodess, "News Coverage of European Politics."

168 For a similar choice, e.g. Vetters, „Konvent + Verfassung = Öffentlichkeit.". 148.

169 Kevin, *Europe in the Media.* 51. Albrecht Lüter, "Politische Profilbildung jenseits der Parteien? Redaktionelle Linien in Kommentaren deutscher Qualitätszeitungen," in *Die Stimme der Medien. Pressekommentare und politische Öffentlichkeit in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, ed. Christiane Eilders, Friedhelm Neidhardt, and Barbara Pfetsch (Wiesbaden, 2004), 181.

170 Haverland, „Does the EU cause domestic developments?" 139, 144.

171 E.g. Steeg, „Does a public sphere exist in the EU?," 621f, Steeg, „The public sphere in the European Union.". 141. Knorr's finding that coverage does not differ in the debate on international politics is irrelevant here. Cf. Knorr, Europäische Öffentlichkeit und transnationale Kommunikation im sicherheitspolitischen Bereich, 220–225.

172 Cf. for systematic considerations and for Switzerland respectively the US as a comparative case Haverland, „Does the EU cause domestic developments?," 139–141.

empirical phenomenon through a comparison with other public spheres.[173] How-
ever, this study seeks to inquire into structural changes throughout time.

The limitation to quality newspapers admittedly implies an elite bias. How-
ever, regional and tabloid newspapers were excluded from this study mainly for
methodological reasons. Given the differences in media structures between the
three countries, it would have been difficult to find comparable cases. While in
Britain and Germany tabloid newspapers are very important, there is no such tra-
dition in France. Conversely, regional newspapers are very important in Germany
and France, but rather marginal in the UK, where the London newspapers domi-
nate.[174] Even though it is difficult to underestimate the role of television in opinion
formation within the public sphere, TV was excluded for methodological and
practical reasons. The analysis of audio-visual materials requires a complex meth-
odology and the consideration of additional contexts such as the different tradi-
tions of TV news programming. Finally, access to historical TV sources is prohibi-
tively expensive. Broadcasters' archives are run as profit centres providing serv-
ices for TV production and have to be paid for at commercial rates.

Even though public opinion is at the core of the concept of the public sphere,
the *effect* of European public communication will not be examined in this study.[175]
Reception research is highly complex and near-impossible to undertake in a his-
torical perspective, due to a lack of suitable sources. Using Euro-Barometer poll
data could serve as a very rough proxy; however, it is impossible to systematically
link these data to the media coverage in a credible way. The focus in this study is
on the *content and the structure* of European public communication in the media
instead. In addition to written sources, I conducted interviews in Brussels in July
2004 with the current and occasionally also with the former European correspond-
ents of all the newspapers I have used. Additionally, I spoke with the press repre-
sentatives of the permanent representations of France, the UK and Germany, as
well as the retired press officer of the Council of Ministers. Most of the information
from the interviews relates to the present. However, some of the interviewees were
able to provide information on Brussels and summit news practices and their tra-
ditions. These interviews largely served as background material.

1.6 Organisation of my study

This historical study of European public communication takes the theoretical de-
bate on the European public sphere as its point of departure. The second chapter
explores the theoretical background in greater detail, to develop hypotheses and
guiding questions in a more thorough manner and explain the choice of methods
applied. Chapter three will provide the necessary context for the analysis, in par-
ticular an assessment of those factors which are likely to have influenced the de-

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173 This is the approach suggested by: Risse, „Auf dem Weg zu einer europäischen Kommunikati-
    onsgemeinschaft," 144.
174 Pfetsch et al., The Voice of the Media in European Public Sphere, 11.
175 For a recent example of the kind of research that attempts to assess public opinion in electoral
    behaviour cf. Sarah Binzer Hobolt, „Taking Cues on Europe? Voter Competence and Party En-
    dorsements in Referendums on European Integration," *European Journal of Political Research* 46
    (2007): 151.

velopment of European public communication. Considering the development of European integration from a longer-term perspective, as well as with regard to the short-term context around the summits will allow the link between European integration and the European public sphere to be examined: Has the latter really lagged behind the former? Specific national ideas on Europe as well as the conditions and traditions of the newspapers are likely to have shaped European public communication. In chapter four, I will present the findings of the comparative analysis of the newspapers, addressing the five research questions in turn. In the final part, I will summarise the development of European public communication and draw conclusions with respect to the history of European integration, the possible reasons for the development and the implications for the debate on European integration and democracy.