Mouroutsou, G: Metapher der Mischung in den platonischen Dia

Diskrepanzen oder Zusammenhangslosigkeit und verfolgt statt dessen Schritt für Schritt die Übertragung der Teilhabe in der dialogischen Bewegung. Der Dialektiker verlässt zunächst das Wahrnehmbare, um den holistischen Ansprüchen der Ideendialektik nachzugehen, kehrt dann jedoch zu ihm zurück. In der vierfachen Einteilung des Ganzen (Phil. 23-27), in der Mouroutsou die Mischung als Ort der Genese der schönen Erscheinungen deutet, zeigt sich Platon als Retter der Phänomene. Nach dem Aufstieg zum Verwachsensein der zwei platonischen Prinzipien degradiert der Philosoph sie nicht länger als 'zwischen Sein und Nicht-Sein herumschweifend' (R. 479d), sondern würdigt sie als 'Zeugung'. Schönheit und Ordnung entstehen durch eine Bezähmung und Bändigung des nie völlig Bezähmbaren, dem sie agonal abgerungen werden: Es geht um die Prägung des Seins auf das von sich aus widerstrebende Werden.Die Momente der Mischung des Sophistes und des Philebos sind verschieden und jeweils anders bedingt. Die vorliegende Deutung versucht nicht, das eine Konzept durch das andere zu erklären; stattdessen integriert sie beide Momente in eine umfassendere dialektische Bewegung. Der Bezug auf Aristoteles erweist sich bei der Platon-Interpretation erneut als unumgänglich, obgleich sich unser Platonsbild seinetwegen oft nur mühevoll rekonstruieren lässt.***The 'mixture' takes on an exquisite role in the later Platonic dialogues. Georgia Mouroutsou focuses on the Sophist and the Philebus and places the central Platonic concept of mixture within the entire transference and transformation of participation (methexis).In the Platonic philosophy, we ascend from the level of the participation of the sensible things in the ideas to the participation of the ideas and finally to the third kind of participation of the two Platonic principles. The author rehabilitates the essence of mixture as metaphor, namely as the transformation of a sensible image, whose prephilosophical domains are sexual intercourse as well as mixing wine and water, into a philosophical one: 'Mixture' designates namely the relation between the greatest kinds in the Sophist as well as the one between the limit and the unlimited in the Philebus.In her second chapter on the Sophist, Mouroutsou's guiding question is: Why can we legitimate the mixture between the forms of being and otherness as a better candidate than participation? With a thorough analysis of the hotly debated passages (Soph. 246a-259b) and illuminating discussion of the secondary literature, the author shows the Platonic mixture to be a well-founded transformation of methexis in the context of the equioriginal 'greatest kinds': After providing an outline of the general ontology of being qua being as 'power to act and to be acted upon', the Eleatic Guest turns to the special ontology of the divine forms. The dialogue culminates in the mixture of the forms of being and otherness, which are not separate elements that afterwards come into mixture and combination. Rather, they gain their being in their inseparable connection to each other in spite of their being separable in our dialectic investigation.Mouroutsou's interpretation of the Philebus restores its disputed unity and reconstructs the dialectician's movement from the participation of the Sensible in the forms to the participation of the two Platonic principles and back to the Sensible (15-27). The author shows how Plato 'saves' the good phenomena: In the fourfold division (23-27), the good and beautiful appearances are generated as mixture of limit and unlimited. It is to them the philosopher returns after his ascent to the two Platonic principles. The Sensible is no longer degraded as 'rolling about in the midregion between being and not-being' (R. 479d), but is rather reevaluated as 'procreation'. The world emerges, according to Plato, as being (the limit in the Philebus) determines becoming (the Unlimited), while the latter resists this determination as the Philebus and the Timaeus reveal. The world is created as cosmos: not as the entirety of the present beings, but rather as an agonal restraining of becoming that can never be totally restrained. In this way, order and beauty can be wrested from it, whether in the domain of handcrafts, in the theory and practice of the mixed good life, or in the framework of cosmic creation itself.Mouroutsou avoids the danger of identifying the two different concepts of mixture of the Sophist and the Philebus as she situates them in the broader movement of the dialectician. Reference to Aristotle has been proven once more essential for Platonic hermeneutics. Nonetheless, Aristotle is accused of pinning down the entire movement of participation to its first level, restricting his polemics to it and being unwilling to comprehend the transmission of methexis as a whole.