Produktinformationen zu „Blameworthy Belief “
Believing the wrong thing can have drastic consequences. The question of when a person is not only ill-guided, but genuinely at fault for holding a particular belief goes to the root of our understanding of such notions as criminal negligence and moral responsibility. This book explores the conditions under which someone may be deemed blameworthy for holding a particular belief, drawing on contemporary epistemology, ethics and legal scholarship.
Klappentext zu „Blameworthy Belief “
Believing the wrong thing can have drastic consequences. The question of when a person is not only ill-guided, but genuinely at fault for holding a particular belief goes to the root of our understanding of such notions as criminal negligence and moral responsibility. This book explores the conditions under which someone may be deemed blameworthy for holding a particular belief, drawing on contemporary epistemology, ethics and legal scholarship.
Inhaltsverzeichnis zu „Blameworthy Belief “
Belief and Acceptance.- Approaching a Conception of Epistemic Blameworthiness.- Blameworthy Belief as Inexcusably Undesirable Belief.- Epistemic Undesirability.- Bruce Russell's Basic Analysis of the Notion of Epistemic Blameworthiness.- Doxastic Control.- Direct Content-Directed Doxastic Control or Doxastic Voluntarism.- Direct Property-Directed Doxastic Control or Property Voluntarism.- Indirect Content-Directed Doxastic Control or Doxastic Pascalianism.- Indirect Property-Directed Doxastic Control or Property Pascalianism.- Intellectual Obligations.- Foresight and Blameworthy Inadvertence to Risk.- Epistemic Blameworthiness Analysed.- Epistemic Autonomy.
Bibliographische Angaben
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Autor:
Nikolaj Nottelmann
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2007, 296 Seiten, Masse: 16 x 24,1 cm, Gebunden, Englisch
- Verlag: Springer Netherlands
- ISBN-10: 1402059604
- ISBN-13: 9781402059605
- Erscheinungsdatum: 20.06.2007
Rezension zu „Blameworthy Belief “
"Nikolaj Nottelmann's Blameworthy Belief is unique in being an up-to-date monograph devoted entirely to the problem of a moral appraisal of beliefs and the closely related problem of deciding to believe (doxastic voluntarism and anti-voluntarism). It is argued that rational agents may be appropriate objects of deontic attitudes, in particular blameworthiness. Nottelmann thereby offers an original and in depth defence of the deontological conception of epistemic justification. Blameworthy Belief is bound to become a highly influential work and is of great interest not only to epistemologists, but also to philosophers of law and moral philosophers." Heinrich Wansing, Professor of Philosophy of Science and Logic, Dresden University of Technology, Germany
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